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The de Finetti Theorem is a cornerstone of the Bayesian approach. Bernardo
(1996, p. 5) writes that its “message is very clear: if a sequence of observations is
judgedtobeexchangeable,thenanysubsetofthemmustberegardedasarandom
sample from some model, and there exists a prior distribution on the parameter
of such model, hence requiring a Bayesian approach.” We argue that although ex-
changeability, interpreted as symmetry of evidence, is a weak assumption, when
combined with subjective expected utility theory, it also implies complete conﬁ-
dence that experiments are identical. When evidence is sparse and there is little
evidence of symmetry, this implication of de Finetti’s hypotheses is not intuitive.
This motivates our adoption of multiple-priors utility as the benchmark model of
preference. We provide two alternative generalizations of the de Finetti Theorem
for this framework. A model of updating is also provided.




1.1 Motivation and objectives
An individual is considering bets on the outcomes of a sequence of coin tosses. It is
the same coin being tossed repeatedly, but different tosses are performed by different
people. The individual believes that outcomes depend both on the (unknown) physical
makeup or bias of the coin and on the way in which the coin is tossed. Her understand-
ing of tossing technique is poor. However, she has no reason to distinguish between the
techniques of different people and she views technique as being idiosyncratic. Given
this perception, how would she rank bets?
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More generally, we are interested in modeling a decision-maker who is facing a se-
quence of experiments and whose perception is that outcomes are inﬂuenced by two
factors—one that is well understood and ﬁxed across experiments (coin bias), and the
other that is poorly understood and thought to be unrelated across experiments. This
descriptionwouldseemtoapplytomanychoicesettings, wherethedecision-makerhas
a theory or model of her environment, but where she is sophisticated enough to realize
that it is “incomplete”; hence the second factor, which can be thought of as an “error
term” for her model.
We limit ourselves to situations where, in addition, there is symmetry of evidence
about the experiments: no information is given that would imply a distinction between
them. However, if little information is provided about any of the experiments, in which
casethereislittleevidenceofsymmetry, asophisticatedindividualmightverywelladmit
the possibility that the experiments may differ in some way, and this may inﬂuence her
ranking of bets. The distinction between the two forms of symmetry is due to Walley
(1991), who also argued that this distinction is behaviorally meaningful and that it can-
not be accommodated within the Bayesian framework. Following the terminological
distinction introduced in Epstein and Schneider (2003), we also refer to experiments as
being indistinguishable but not necessarily identical.
A prime motivating example is where the decision-maker is a statistician or empiri-
cist, and an experiment is part of a statistical model of how data are generated. Invari-
ably, symmetry is assumed at some level, perhaps after correcting for perceived asym-
metries such as heteroscedasticity of errors in a regression model. Standard statistical
methods presume that after such corrections, the identical statistical model applies to
all experiments or observations. This practice has been criticized as being particularly
inappropriate in the context of the literature attempting to explain cross-country differ-
ences in growth rates, in which case an experiment corresponds to a country. Brock and
Durlauf (2001, p. 231) argue that it is “a major source of skepticism about the empirical
growth literature.” They write further that “where the analyst can be speciﬁc about po-
tential differences [between countries], she can presumably (test and) correct for them
by existing statistical methods. However, the open-endedness of growth theories makes
it impossible to account in this way for all possible differences.” Since they also empha-
sizetheimportanceofhavingsounddecision-theoreticfoundationsforstatisticalmeth-
ods, particularly for purposes of policy analysis, we interpret their paper as calling (ﬁrst)
for a model of decision-making that would permit the analyst to express a judgement of
“similarity” or “indistinguishability,” but also a concern that countries or experiments
may differ, even if she cannot specify how. Such a model is our objective.
1.2 The de Finetti Bayesian model
Some readers may be wondering why there is a need for a new model of choice. Does
not the exchangeable Bayesian model due to de Finetti adequately capture beliefs and,
in conjunction with subjective expected utility, also choice in the coin-tossing setting
(and more generally)?
RecalldeFinetti’smodelandcelebratedtheorem(deFinetti1937,HewittandSavage
1955). There is a countable inﬁnity of experiments, indexed by the set N ={ 1 2    }.Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Symmetry of evidence 315
Each experiment yields an outcome in the set S and thus   = S∞ is the set of all possible
samplepaths(technicaldetailsaresuppresseduntillater). AprobabilitymeasureP on 
is exchangeable if
P(A1 ×A2 ×···) = P(Aπ−1(1) ×Aπ−1(2) ×···)
for all ﬁnite permutations π of N. de Finetti shows that exchangeability is equivalent to
the following representation: There exists a (necessarily unique) probability measure μ




 ∞(·)dμ( )  (1.1)
where,foranyprobabilitymeasure onS (written  ∈  (S)),  ∞ denotesthecorrespond-
ing independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) product measure on  .1
Given a Bayesian prior, symmetry of evidence implies exchangeability and, there-
fore, de Finetti’s representation, which admits the obvious interpretation: The individ-
ual is uncertain about which probability law   describes any single experiment. How-
ever, conditional on any   in the support of μ, it is the i.i.d. product  ∞ that describes
the implied probability law on  . This suggests that there is no room in the model to
accommodate a concern with experiments not being identical. In Section 4,w ec o n -
ﬁrm this suggestion at the behavioral level by identifying behavior that is intuitive for
an individual who is not completely conﬁdent that experiments are identical, but yet is
ruled out by the Independence Axiom of subjective expected utility theory. Thus we pro-
pose a model that generalizes the exchangeable Bayesian model by suitably relaxing the
Independence Axiom.
Speciﬁcally, we adopt the framework of multiple-priors utility (Gilboa and Schmei-
dler 1989) and specialize it by adding axioms, forms of “exchangeability,” for example,
that capture alternative hypotheses about how the relationship between experiments is
perceived. Two alternativegeneralizations ofdeFinetti’s theoremareestablished. Inthe
ﬁrst(Theorem3.2), thedecomposition(1.1)ofaBayesianprior isgeneralizedsothatthe
individual’s set of priors P has the form
P =

 ∞(·)dμ( ):μ ∈ M

for some set of probability measures M over  (S); equivalently, every measure in P is
exchangeable. An interpretation is that there is ex ante ambiguity about which like-
lihood function applies, but certainty that the same likelihood function applies to all
experiments. Thus, just for the Bayesian case, experiments are perceived as identical.
The second generalization of de Finetti’s Theorem (see Theorem 5.2) relaxes the lat-
ter feature and accommodates the absence of (overwhelming) evidence of symmetry.
(However, ex ante ambiguity is precluded, so that this result does not generalize the ﬁrst
1Though the de Finetti Theorem can be viewed as a result in probability theory alone, it is typically un-
derstood in economics as describing the prior in the subjective expected utility model of choice. That is
how we view it in this paper.316 Epstein and Seo Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
one.) The corresponding representation for P is more complicated: it retains a counter-
part of the single prior μ,b u tw h e r eμ is a probability measure over, roughly speaking,
nonsingleton sets of likelihoods, which sets are the unknown parameters in the repre-
sentation. The following informal description gives a sense of how “indistinguishable
but not identical” is captured. Consider the introductory coin-tossing setting for con-
creteness, so that S ={ H T}. In the Bayesian model, each experiment is characterized




same interval. However, they are not identical, because any probability in the interval
could apply to any experiment. The length of the interval parametrizes the importance
of idiosyncratic poorly understood factors and varies with preference, hence with the
individual.
1.3 Updating
As indicated, one formal contribution of this paper is to generalize de Finetti’s Theorem
from probability measures to sets of priors. However, the importance of the de Finetti
Theorem extends beyond the representation to the connection it affords between sub-
jectivebeliefsandempiricalfrequencies,mostnotablythroughBayesianupdatingofthe
prior μ. The combination of the de Finetti Theorem and Bayes’ Rule gives the canonical
model of learning or inference in economics and statistics. Under well known condi-
tions, it yields the important conclusion that priors will eventually be swamped by data
and that individuals will learn the truth (see Savage 1972, Chap. 3.6, for example). Our
second major contribution is to show that (with some qualiﬁcation) Bayesian updat-
ing extends to the case where experiments may not be identical, as formalized by our
second model (Theorem 5.2).
It is well known that ambiguity poses difﬁculties for updating and that there is no
consensus updating rule analogous to Bayes’ Rule. However, our second model admits
intuitive (and dynamically consistent) updating in a limited but still interesting class of
environments, namely, where an individual ﬁrst samples and observes the outcomes
of some experiments, and then chooses how to bet on the outcomes of remaining ex-
periments. The essential point is that each experiment serves either as a signal or is
payoff-relevant, but not both. For example, think of a statistical decision-maker who,
after observing the results of some experiments, is concerned with predicting the re-
sults of others because he must take an action (estimation or hypothesis testing per-
haps) whose payoff depends on their outcomes. Policy evaluation in the context of
cross-country growth is a concrete application, where the choice between policies for
a particular country is based on observations of how these policies fared in other coun-
tries. Our model prescribes a way to use the latter information that accommodates the
policy-maker’sconcernthatcountriesmaydifferinwaysthatarepoorlyunderstoodand
that are not taken into account in the model of growth.
Besides being well founded axiomatically, the model of updating is also tractable.
This aspect stems from the fact that given the model of Theorem 5.2, beliefs at everyTheoretical Economics 5 (2010) Symmetry of evidence 317
node are completely deﬁned by a (unique) probability measure over the unknown para-
meters. Thus one need only describe how information is incorporated into an additive
probability measure, rather than dealing with the thornier problem of updating a set
of priors. As shown in Theorem 6.1, this can be done in a way that mirrors standard
Bayesian updating. A consequence is that formal results from Bayesian learning theory
can be translated into our model, though with suitable reinterpretation. As one exam-
ple, we establish (Proposition 6.3) a counterpart of the Savage result that data eventu-
ally swamp the prior. In the coin-tossing example, the individual asymptotically con-
verges to certainty about a particular bias, and hence about a speciﬁc probability inter-
val, but since she may still be left with an interval, she may remain ambiguous about
tossing technique and thus remain concerned that experiments differ. She learns all
that she believes that she can, given her ex ante perception of the experiments, which,
in turn, underlies her preferences. If the truth is that tossing technique is not important
and if that possibility is admitted in her prior view, then she will converge to the truth
asymptotically.
1.4 Related literature
Kreps (1988, Chap. 11) refers to the de Finetti Theorem as “the fundamental theorem of
(most) statistics” because of the justiﬁcation it provides for the analyst to view samples
as being independent and identically distributed with unknown distribution function:
this is warranted if and only if samples are assessed ex ante as being exchangeable. As a
result, and also because similarity judgements naturally play a central role in statistical
analysis, the notion of exchangeability underlies much of common empirical practice.
Bayesiansoftenrefertoexchangeabilityasaweakassumption. Schervish(1995,p .8)
writes, “The motivation for the deﬁnition of exchangeability is to express symmetry of
beliefs... in the weakest possible way. The deﬁnition... does not require any judgement
of independence or that any limit of relative frequencies will exist. It merely says that
the labeling of random quantities is immaterial.” We agree that “symmetry of beliefs,”
in the sense of “symmetry of evidence,” is a weak assumption. Our objection is to the
(implicit) companion hypothesis of subjective expected utility (SEU) preferences. To
improve upon exchangeability, Bayesians have proposed weaker notions that build in
less symmetry, while maintaining SEU; see Schervish’s Chapter 8, for example. Such ex-
tensionswithintheBayesianframeworkdonotpermittheseparatemodelingofaconcern
with evidence of symmetry in an environment where evidence is symmetric.
Brock and Durlauf’s (2001) critique of the empirical growth literature is in part ex-
pressed as a critique of the assumption of (a conditional or partial form of) exchange-
ability. In our view, the culprit is not symmetry, but rather the implicit assumption of
expected utility theory.
We have already acknowledged our debt to Walley (1991) for the critique that moti-
vates this paper and for the distinction that we have adopted as a title. His contribution
to modeling the distinction is described brieﬂy in Section 3.
Finally, Epstein and Schneider (2003) model the distinction between symmetry of
evidence and evidence of symmetry in the special case where experiments are viewed318 Epstein and Seo Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
as being completely unrelated (in the context of the above example of repeated tosses of
a single coin, they assume that the physical bias is known with certainty). Epstein and
Schneider (2007) study the more general case dealt with here (unknown physical bias).
A major difference from this paper is that they describe functional forms and provide
informal justiﬁcation, partly through applications, while here the focus is on axiomatic
foundations.
2. Preliminaries
2.1 The Bayesian model
Thereexistsacountableinﬁnityofexperiments. Theyareorderedandindexedbytheset
N ={ 1 2    }. Each experiment yields an outcome in the ﬁnite set S. The set of possible
outcomes for the ith experiment is sometimes denoted Si, though Si = S for all i.T h e
full state space is
  = S∞ = S1 ×S2 ×···=S∞ 
Denoteby theproductσ-algebraon . Probabilitymeasureson(   )areunderstood
to be countably additive unless speciﬁed otherwise.
An act is a  -measurable function from   into [0 1]. For example, when S ={ H T},
then the act f,
f(s1     si    )=

1 if (s1 s2) = (H T)
0 otherwise,
is the bet on heads followed by tails; below it will often be abbreviated by H1T2 (sim-
ilar abbreviations are adopted for other acts in the coin-tossing context). Preference,
denoted  ,i sd e ﬁ n e do nt h es e tF of all acts.
For any subset I of N,  I denotes the product σ-algebra on

i∈I Si, also identiﬁed
with a σ-algebra on  . Denote by FI the set of all acts that are  I-measurable. (When
I ={ i},w ew r i t e i and f ∈ Fi.) Such acts will be said to depend only on experiments






Refer to such acts as ﬁnitely based.
Denote by   the set of ﬁnite permutations of N; all permutations appearing in the
paper should be understood to be ﬁnite. For any π in   and probability measure P
on (S∞  ),d e ﬁ n eπP to be the unique probability measure on S∞ satisfying (for all
rectangles)
(πP)(A1 ×A2 ×···) = P(Aπ−1(1) ×Aπ−1(2) ×···) 
Givenanactf,deﬁnethepermutedactπf by (πf)(s1     st    )= f(sπ(1)     sπ(t)    ).
Abbreviate

fd Pby Pf,o rP(f). Then, for all P, f,a n dπ,
(πP)f = P(πf) Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Symmetry of evidence 319
The probability measure P is exchangeable if πP = P for all π. In behavioral terms,
assuming subjective expected utility preference with prior P, exchangeability of P is
equivalent to the universal indifference between an act and any permuted variant, that
is,
f ∼ πf for all acts f and permutations π 
For any probability measure   on S (write   ∈  (S)),  ∞ denotes the corresponding
i.i.d. product measure on (   ).
Theorem 2.1 (de Finetti). The probability measure P on (   ) is exchangeable if and




 ∞(·)dμ( ) 
Anoteworthyandproblematicfeatureoftheframework,whichweadoptalsobelow,
is that payoffs to acts depend on the outcomes of inﬁnitely many experiments, which is
problematic for a positive model. In particular, the domain of preference includes acts
whose payoffs depend on the truth/falsity of tail events, which are not observed in ﬁ-
nite time and thus are, in fact, unobservable.2 This concern was emphasized also by de
Finetti; seeRegazzini (1996)forextensive discussion ofdeFinetti’sview and alsoDubins
(1974). However, a decision-maker might be able to conceive of payoffs that depend
on tail events (receive x∗ if the limiting empirical frequency of heads in an inﬁnite se-
quence of tosses is greater than 1
2 and x otherwise). Thus the de Finetti Theorem and its
generalizations below seem useful in a normative context.3
Another objection to the de Finetti–Savage model is that raised by Walley and de-
scribed in the Introduction—that symmetry of evidence in their model implies also that
experimentsarenecessarilyviewedasbeingidentical. Elaboratinguponandaccommo-
dating this critique are the objectives of this paper, and is the reason that we move from
subjective expected utility (SEU) to the multiple-priors model.
For any compact metric space X,  (X) denotes the set of countably additive Borel
probability measures on X, endowed with the weak-convergence topology induced by
continuous functions. K(X) denotes the space of compact subsets of X,e n d o w e dw i t h
the Hausdorff metric topology, which renders it compact metric. When X is a lts, Kc(X)
denotes the subspace of compact and convex subsets of X.
2.2 Multiple-priors preference
By a multiple-priors preference (or utility), we mean a preference   on F that has a
representation of the following form. There exists a convex set P ⊂  ( ),c o m p a c ti n






fd P   f∈ F  (2.1)





3In fact, we have overstated the problem somewhat in as much as our central axioms concern only the
ranking of acts that depend on ﬁnitely many experiments.320 Epstein and Seo Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
In Section 7, we relate this speciﬁcation to the Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989)
formulation—ours is a specialization—and we provide behavioral foundations for (2.1).
Since we suspect that some readers will consider this material to be largely “technical,”
we defer it to the end.
One difference that may seem important, but that is in fact of minor signiﬁcance,
can be dealt with here. In this paper, acts are taken to be real-valued and they enter
linearlyintotheutilitycalculationin(2.1). Incontrast,GilboaandSchmeidlerandmuch
of the related literature consider Anscombe–Aumann acts f that have lotteries in  (Z)
over a primitive set Z as outcomes. However, this speciﬁcation of objects of choice can
be reduced to ours as follows: Suppose also that there exist best and worst outcomes z
and z. Then, under weak conditions, for each state ω and act f, there exists a unique
probability p, so that the constant act f(ω)is indifferent to the lottery (z p;z 1 − p).
Refer to such a lottery as (a bet on) the toss of a (objective) p-coin.4 One can deﬁne







Such calibration renders the util-outcomes of any act observable, and these are the
[0 1]-valuedoutcomes we assume herein and thatjustify writing utility as in (2.1). A fur-
ther consequence given (2.1) is that the utility U(f)is also scaled in probability units: it
satisﬁes
f ∼ (z U(f);z 1−U(f))  (2.3)
Thus f is indifferent to betting on the toss of a U(f)-coin.
The fact that outcomes are “equivalent” probabilities will be important below; multi-
plying outcomes, which may seem unnatural, will amount to the very natural operation
of multiplying probabilities.
Weconcludethis section withan elementarylemmathatwe userepeatedly. Saythat
P ∈ P is a minimizing,o rsupporting, measure for f if the inﬁmum in (2.1)i sa c h i e v e d
at P.I ff is (lower semi-)continuous, such as if f is ﬁnitely based, then there is a mini-
mizer in P, but not so in general.
Lemma 2.2. Let fi ∈ Fﬁn and αi > 0, i = 1     n,w i t h
n










if and only if every measure supporting
n
i=1αifi also supports every fi.I n p a r t i c u l a r ,












4We do not always repeat “objective” below, but there should be no confusion between the motivating
coin-tossing experiment described in the Introduction, where uncertainty is subjective, and these tosses of
an objective coin that deﬁne lotteries used to calibrate utility outcomes.Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Symmetry of evidence 321













if P∗ is not minimizing for some fi. The rest of the proof is obvious.  
3. Strong exchangeability
Turn ﬁnally to the core question—how to model the distinction described in the title.
The ﬁrst part is obvious: If evidence is symmetric, then it is intuitive that an individ-
ual would satisfy the following axiom.
Symmetry. For all ﬁnitely based acts f and permutations π, f ∼ πf .
Assuming subjective expected utility, Symmetry is equivalent to exchangeability of
the prior, as noted above. But Symmetry in itself is a relatively weak assumption follow-
ing, for example, from symmetry of information about all the experiments. The force of
the assumption of Symmetry, as reﬂected in de Finetti’s theorem, stems largely from the
added assumption of expected utility theory or a single prior, as will be evident shortly.
In a multiple-priors framework, relatively little structure is implied for the set of priors.
(See Section 7.1 for a proof.)
Proposition 3.1. Let   be represented by multiple-priors utility as in (2.1), with set of
priors P.T h e n  satisﬁes Symmetry if and only if for every ﬁnite permutation π,
P ∈ P  ⇒ πP ∈ P  (3.1)
Say that P is symmetric if it satisﬁes (3.1).
The heart of the paper concerns modeling the perception of “limited evidence of
symmetry.” BeforearguingthattheIndependenceAxiomexcludesit,westatetheaxiom:
Independence. For all α in (0 1),
f   g ⇐⇒ αf +(1−α)h   αg +(1−α)h 
Consider bets in the coin-tossing example. Symmetry implies the indifference
H1T2 ∼ T1H2 
Here H1T2 is the bet that pays 1 util if the ﬁrst toss yields heads and the second yields
tails; the bet T1H2 is interpreted similarly. Consider now the choice between either of
the above bets and the mixture 1
2H1T2 + 1
2T1H2, the bet paying 1
2 if {H1T2 T1H2} and 0
otherwise. The Independence Axiom would imply that
1
2H1T2 + 1
2T1H2 ∼ H1T2 ∼ T1H2 322 Epstein and Seo Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
This is intuitive given certainty that tossing technique does not vary, since then there is
nothing to be gained by mixing; neither is there a cost because outcomes are denomi-
nated in utils. On the other hand, if the individual admits the possibility that technique
varies, and hence that experiments are not identical, then she may strictly prefer the
mixture because the bets H1T2 and T1H2 hedge one another: the former pays well if the
ﬁrst toss is biased toward heads and the second toward tails, pays poorly if the opposite
bias pattern is valid, and these “good” and “bad” scenarios are reversed for act T1H2.
Thus 1
2H1T2 + 1




2T1H2   H1T2 ∼ T1H2  (3.2)
contrary to the Independence Axiom.5
It merits emphasis that concern with the coins not being identical is not a (prob-
abilistic) risk: If it were, then, because payoffs are in utils, there would be no value to
hedging the risk and hence to randomization. Put another way, it is not possible to
modelthenotedconcernbyusingasingleprobabilitymeasure,sincesymmetryofinfor-
mation suggests immediately that the associated probability measure is exchangeable,
leaving no room for possible differences between coins. This is the heart of Walley’s
criticism of the exchangeable Bayesian model.
There is another motivation for randomizing which is not derived from the concern
that experiments may not be identical. Thus, for example, consider the rankings
1
2H1 + 1
2T2   H1 ∼ T2  (3.3)
Here we assume for simplicity that heads and tails are thought to be equally likely. Sup-
pose further that tossing technique is thought to be irrelevant. Nevertheless, the mixed
bet 1
2H1 + 1
2T2 may be strictly preferable if there is ambiguity about the physical bias of
the coin; this is the key intuition in Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
Both reasons for randomizing, and hence both forms of violations of Independence,
seem important. We do not have a single model that accommodatesboth (see, however,
the remark at the end of Section 5.2). In this paper, we describe two models, each of
which accommodates one of (3.2)a n d( 3.3) but not the other.
The next axiom permits only the second rationale for randomizing. Note that it is
redundant in the Bayesian case because it is implied by Symmetry and Independence.
Strong Exchangeability. For all ﬁnitely based acts f and all α in [0 1],
αf +(1−α)πf ∼ f 
Theorem 3.2. Let   be represented by a multiple-priors utility function as in (2.1), with
set of priors P. Then the following conditions are equivalent.
5Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) suggest that since randomization smooths out payoffs across ambiguous
states, a strict preference for randomization reveals an aversion to ambiguity. We rely heavily on similar
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(i)   satisﬁes Strong Exchangeability.
(ii) Every prior P in P is exchangeable.
(iii) There exists M ⊂  ( (S)) such that
P =

 ∞(·)dμ( ):μ ∈ M

  (3.4)
Proof. The equivalence of (ii) and (iii) follows from de Finetti’s Theorem.
(ii)  ⇒ (i) By assumption, for every P in P,a c tf, and permutation π,
P(πf)= (πP)f = Pf 







Pf = P∗f 
that is, P∗ is also minimizing for πf . Therefore, Lemma 2.2 gives the result.
(i)  ⇒ (ii) Assume Strong Exchangeability. The indifference asserted in the axiom
extends to all (not necessarily ﬁnitely based) acts (see Section 7.1). Refer to P∗ in P as an




Thenαf +(1−α)πf ∼ f impliesthereisacommonminimizingmeasureforf andπf  ⇒
P∗ = πP∗, and this is true for every π.T h a ti s ,P∗ is exchangeable.
Argue next that P equals the closed convex hull of its exposed points: Let c( )
be the linear space generated by  ( ); it is separable when endowed with the weak-
convergence topology. Therefore, C( ), the Banach space of continuous real-valued
functions with the sup norm is an Asplund space (Phelps 1989, Theorem 2.12). The
assertion now follows from Phelps (1989, Theorem 5.12).
Finally, (ii) is implied by the fact that the set of all exchangeable measures in P is
closed and convex. (Convexity is obvious. P is exchangeable if and only if, for every π
and for every f ∈ Fﬁn,
Pf = P(πf) 
Since f ∈ Fﬁn is continuous, this equality is preserved in the weak-convergence limit.)  
Part(iii) clariﬁeshowamodelwithStrongExchangeability differsfromthedeFinetti
model. Conﬁrmingtheintuitiondescribedprecedingtheaxiom,therepresentation(3.4)
suggests the interpretation whereby the individual is uncertain ex ante which likelihood
functionapplies,butsheiscertainthatthesamelikelihoodfunctionappliestoallexper-
iments. ThisisjustasfortheBayesiancase—experimentsareperceivedasidentical. The
difference here is that the ex ante uncertainty is in general not representable by a single
probability measure; there is ambiguity rather than risk regarding the true likelihood
function.324 Epstein and Seo Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
Remark 1. Walley (1991, Chap. 9) deﬁnes and discusses exchangeability for “previ-
sions” ν,w h e r eν(f) is interpreted as the maximum price (in utils) the individual would
be willing to pay for the act f, that is, so that the act f −ν(f) is just desirable. Symmetry
ofevidenceisexpressedthroughindifferencebetweenanactf andanypermutation πf ,
in the sense that ν(f) = ν(πf). Walley suggests an additional axiom, which he calls ex-
changeability, which states that
ν(πf −f)= 0 for all f and π 
The axiom, and his representation result, bear some similarity to Strong Exchangeabil-
ity and Theorem 3.2. His formulation leads to results that follow almost by deﬁnition;
for example, the heavy machinery invoked in the proof of our theorem is not needed.
Further results for lower previsions appear in de Cooman and Miranda (2007) and de
Cooman et al. (2009).
4. Nonidentical experiments
In this section, we describe a model that accommodates the strict preference for ran-
domizationin(3.2)andthataccordingly,weinterpretascapturingaconcernthatexper-
iments may differ. In terms of the implied representation to be described below (The-
orem 5.2), it has in common with de Finetti’s (1.1) a single prior, but it differs from his
in featuring (in a suitable sense) multiple likelihoods. The model is based on two new
axioms, alternatives to Strong Exchangeability.
4.1 Orthogonal independence
TheﬁrstaxiomiscalledOrthogonalIndependenceanditexpressesprimarilythatpoorly
understood factors affecting different experiments are unrelated.6 The point is that ran-
domization is a matter of indifference for some bets, and precisely when such indiffer-
ence prevails can be interpreted in terms of the individual’s perception of how experi-
ments are related to one another.
Say that the acts f and g do not hedge one another if, for every 0 <α<1 and p in
[0 1],
f   p ⇐⇒ [αf +(1−α)g   αp +(1−α)g] 
It is easy to see that f and g do not hedge one another if and only if, for all α,
U(α f +(1−α)g) = αU(f)+(1−α)U(g)  (4.1)
We use this characterization repeatedly below (without reference).
Think of coin-tossing for concreteness. If tossing techniques are thought to be un-
related across experiments, then presumably the bets H1 and H2 do not hedge one an-
other. As pointed out in the discussion of (3.3), bets on different experiments can hedge
6Since “independence” has a different meaning in an axiomatic context, we often refer to the “unrelat-
edness” or “stochastic independence” of experiments, though the latter should not be understood in the
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one another if there is ambiguity about the coin’s bias. Here we exclude such ambiguity.
Then the unrelatedness of experiments suggests also that H1T3 and H2T3,f o re x a m p l e ,
do not hedge one another. To illustrate the role of “unrelatedness,” suppose that there is
concern that outcomes on consecutive tosses could be either perfectly negatively corre-
lated (for example, heads implies tails on the next toss) or perfectly positively correlated










and hence that H1T3 and H2T3 hedge one another.
Our axiom builds on this intuition. To express it, we generalize “product bets” such
as H1T3 and consider “product acts.” Given any two acts f∗ and f,t h e nf∗ · f denotes
the pointwise product, that is, the act given by
(f∗ ·f)(ω) = f∗(ω)f(ω) for all ω ∈   
Recall from Section 2.2 that the outcome produced by f in state ω can be viewed as
a coin toss that gives the best “true” underlying outcome z, or utility 1,w i t ho b j e c t i v e
probability f(ω), and the worst outcome z, or utility 0, with the complementary prob-
ability. Similarly, in state ω the product act f∗ · f gives a lottery where 1 util is received
with objective probability f∗(ω)f(ω), corresponding to the independent tosses of the
two coins associated with f∗ and f.
Orthogonal Independence (OI). If f g ∈ FI do not hedge one another, then neither
do f∗ ·f and f∗ ·g for all f∗ ∈ FI∗,w i t hI and I∗ ﬁnite and disjoint.
The axiom weakens Independence since, by (4.1), nonhedging pairs are precisely
those for which utility exhibits the linearity implied by Independence. The reason for
the qualiﬁer “Orthogonal” is that one might refer to acts f∗ and f as in the statement
as being orthogonal because they depend on different experiments. Formally, say that
f∗ and f are (mutually) orthogonal, written f∗ ⊥ f,i ff∗ ∈ FI∗ and f ∈ FI for some dis-
jointI∗ andI. Thefollowingdiagramillustratestheorthogonalityassumedintheaxiom.
Thepositioningofactsabovethelineindicatesthatf andg dependonlyonexperiments
in I,a n df∗ depends only on those in I∗.
Note that all the acts in the axiom statement are ﬁnitely based.
We will use the following lemma repeatedly when invoking OI. It illustrates further
how Orthogonal Independence, given also multiple-priors utility, expresses the unrelat-
edness of experiments.
Lemma 4.1. Let   be represented by a multiple-priors utility function U and satisfy Or-
thogonal Independence. Then, for all ﬁnitely based acts f∗ ⊥ f and g∗ ⊥ g,326 Epstein and Seo Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
(i) f∗ and f are nonhedging
(ii) f∗ ·f and f∗ are nonhedging
(iii) if f and g are nonhedging, and if f∗ and g∗ are either nonhedging or orthogonal,
then f∗ ·f and g∗ ·g, are nonhedging.
By (i), acts that depend on different experiments are nonhedging. The remaining
parts specify conditions under which nonhedging prevails even where acts depend on
overlapping sets of experiments. Some illustrations of nonhedging pairs in the coin-
tossing context were provided above. Other examples of such pairs include {H1T2 T2},
{H1T3 H2H4},a n d{H1 T2}. The latter case implies, contrary to (3.3) (and assuming
again for simplicity that H1 ∼ T2)t h a t
1
2H1 + 1
2T2 ∼ H1 ∼ T2 
Thus, in light of the discussion surrounding (3.3), Orthogonal Independence excludes
ambiguity about the coin’s bias. However, it does permit (3.2) and thus the concern that
experiments may not be identical.
Proof of Lemma 4.1. (ii) Since   is a multiple-priors preference, f and the constant
act 1 are nonhedging. Thus, (ii) follows by OI.








































By Lemma 2.2 (existence of a common minimizer), (i) follows.




4f∗ ·f + 1
4f∗ ·g + 1




































Apply Lemma 2.2 to conclude that f∗ ·f and g∗ ·g are nonhedging.
T h ec a s ew h e r ef∗ and g∗ are orthogonal is straightforward by the preceding
and (i).  
We provide two examples to illustrate what is excluded by Orthogonal Indepen-
dence.Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Symmetry of evidence 327
Example 4.2. Let P0 be any countably additive (not necessarily exchangeable) mea-
sure and deﬁne P to be the closed convex hull of {πP0:π ∈  }. By construction, P is
symmetric. However, it violates OI.
There is a simple interpretation: P0 reﬂects some asymmetries across experiments,
for example, it might be believed that toss 1 is biased toward heads and that the others
are unbiased. If beliefs are instead that there exists exactly one biased toss, though its
identity is completely unknown, one is led to {πP0:π ∈  }.7 Then the agent would be
indifferent between betting on tails for any two coins, but, contrary to OI,s h ew o u l d
strictly prefer to randomize, that is,
1
2T1 + 1
2T2   T1 ∼ T2 
Since the worst case scenario for T1 (T2) is that the ﬁrst (second) coin is the biased one,
the mixture smooths out these uncertainties and guarantees at least one coin that is
not biased against tails. Hence it is strictly preferable. OI is violated because the poorly
understood factor—which toss is the biased one—relates the outcomes of the different
experiments since there is certainty that only one is biased. ♦
Example 4.3. Fixaprobabilitymeasure ∗ in  (S) and let
P ={ P ∈  ( ):mrgSi P =  ∗ for all i} 
Thus P consists of all measures that agree with  ∗ on each Si, with joint distributions
across different experiments being unrestricted. The interpretation is that there is no
ambiguity about the nature of any single experiment, but there is complete ignorance
about how experiments are correlated. This perception of the experiments is not cov-
ered by our model. The individual in our model is uncertain that experiments are iden-
tical because she views each experiment as being affected also by poorly understood
factors that vary across experiments, but she is certain that these are unrelated across
experiments. Here, in contrast, she is concerned with the possible correlation of these
factors across experiments.8
Though P is obviously symmetric, compact, and convex, it lies outside the scope of
our model because it violates OI as we now show.













































+U(H1 ·T2)+U(T2 ·H3)+U(H1 ·H3)+U(H1 ·T2 ·H3)

 
7Taking the closed convex hull has no consequence for decisions.
8In fact, the difference is more subtle, since, as shown in the sequel, OI does permit the perception of
some degree of dependence between experiments.328 Epstein and Seo Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
Thus, there is a common minimizing measure, say P, for the acts H1 T2 H3 H1 · T2 
T2 ·H3 H1 ·H3,a n dH1 ·T2 ·H3. Compute that
U(H1) = U(T2) = U(H3) = 1
2
U(H1 ·T2) = U(T2 ·H3) = U(H1 ·H3) = U(H1 ·T2 ·H3) = 0 
where, for example, U(H1 · T2) = 0 because the worst-case scenario for this act is that
tosses 1 and 2 are perfectly positively correlated. Since P is a common minimizer, de-
duce that
P(H1) = P(T2) = P(H3) = 1
2
P(H1T2) = P(T2H3) = P(H1H3) = P(H1T2H3) = 0 
But there does not exist a probability measure satisfying these conditions. (Since
P(H1T2) = 0, P(H1H3) = 0,a n dP(H1) = 1
2, it follows that
P(H1H2H3) = 0 P ( H 1H2T3) = 1
2
P(H1T2H3) = 0  and P(H1T2T3) = 0 
Combine these with P(T2) = 1
2 and P(T2H3) = 0 to deduce that
P(T1T2H3) = 0 and P(T1T2T3) = 1
2 
Finally, use P(H3) = 1
2 to conclude that P(T1H2H3) = 1
2.B u t t h e n P(H1H2T3) +
P(T1T2T3)+P(T1H2H3)>1.) ♦
4.2 A ﬁnal axiom: Superconvexity
Denote by θ the shift operator, so that, for any act,
(θf)(s1 s2 s3    )= f(s2 s3    );
θn denotes the n-fold replication of θ. It is straightforward to show that Symmetry also
implies indifference to shifts,9
θf ∼ f for all f ∈ F 
For any act g∗ ∈ F{1     n},t h ea c t sg∗ and θnf are orthogonal, and their product is given
by
(g∗ ·θnf)(ω) = g∗(s1     sn)f(sn+1 sn+2    ) 
The ﬁnal axiom strengthens the assumption of convexity of preference, one of the
central axioms in Gilboa and Schmeidler’s (1989) characterization of multiple-priors
(following Schmeidler 1989, they refer to it as uncertainty or ambiguity aversion).
9By Symmetry, U(θ f)= U(f) on Fﬁn.B y Epstein and Wang (1996, Theorem D.2) and Lemma B.8,t h e
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Convexity has the standard meaning that sets of the form {f ∈ F :f   g} are convex.
Given also the other axioms (notably Certainty Independence) used to characterize the
multiple-priors model, the preceding convexity is equivalent to concavity of the utility
function U that represents preference via probability equivalents as in (2.3). For this
reason we call our stronger assumption Superconvexity.
Superconvexity. Let U be the probability-equivalent utility function (as in (2.3)) rep-
resenting the preference  .T h e n ,f o ra l lg∗ h∗ ∈ F{1     n},w i t hg∗ and h∗ nonhedging, and
g∗ ≥ h∗, the function W :Fﬁn → R deﬁned by
W( f)= U(g∗ ·θnf)−U(h∗ ·θnf)
is concave.
In the special case g∗ = 1 and h∗ = 0, the axiom imposes concavity of U(·) on Fﬁn,a s
in the Gilboa–Schmeidler model. We emphasize that Superconvexity is an assumption
about preference: since the utility function U gives the probability equivalents of acts,
the axiom can be expressed explicitly and exclusively in terms of preference.
Finally, it can be understood as follows. For any F  and F (acts over experiments
beyond the nth) because of hedging gains, the individual prefers the mixed act αF  +
(1−α)F as expressed by theconcavity of U(·). The sameis true if theactsand themixed
act are premultiplied by g∗ ∈ F{1     n} or by h∗ ∈ F{1     n}. However, the value of mixing is
smallifh∗ is“small”ateverystate,sincethenpremultiplicationbyh∗ shrinksdifferences
between F , F,a n dαF  + (1 − α)F. (In the extreme case where h∗ = 0, compounding
by h∗ wipes out all differences between acts.) For this reason mixing has greater value
when premultiplication is by g∗, g∗ ≥ h∗. The restriction that g∗ and h∗ be nonhedging
weakens the axiom; in fact, the stronger axiom without that restriction is implied given
the other axioms, as can be seen from the representation derived below.
Although we believed, at an earlier stage in this research, that Superconvexity was
implied by the other axioms, that possibility remains an open question. Note that Su-
perconvexity does not imply Orthogonal Independence, even given the other axioms, as
illustrated by the utility function (5.7) described below.
5. Representations:C onditionally IID
5.1 Ad e ﬁ n i t i o n
Our next objective is to describe the representation implied by Symmetry, Orthogonal
Independence,a n dSuperconvexity. It is our counterpart, or generalization, of the “con-
ditionally i.i.d.” representation in de Finetti’s Theorem. Thus we begin with a deﬁnition
of“stochasticindependence”ofexperimentsforourframework. (Herewemeanthatex-
periments are not related, not even by a common bias in the case of coin tossing. Think
ofthecasewherethebiasisknownwithcertainty.) IntheBayesiansetting,stochasticin-
dependence amounts to beliefs being represented by a product measure. However, the
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to deﬁne a product set of priors consistent with given sets of marginals (for example, see
Hendon et al. 1996 and Ghirardato 1997).
We deﬁne “product” in terms of utility functions rather than directly in terms of sets
of priors. Say that the multiple-priors utility function U,a si n( 2.1), is a product utility
function if
U(f ·g)= U(f)U(g) for all orthogonal f g ∈ Fﬁn  (5.1)
If preference represented by U also satisﬁes Symmetry, then refer to an IID utility func-
tion and to the corresponding set of priors P as an IID set of priors. Following Epstein
and Schneider (2003), the acronym IID stands for independently and indistinguishably
(as opposed to identically) distributed.10
The rationale for (5.1) may seem obvious, but its behavioral meaning should be
made clear. Recall the probability-equivalence nature of outcomes and utility (see (2.2)
and (2.3)). The acts f and g are assumed to depend on different experiments; for con-
creteness, let f ∈ F1 and g ∈ F2. Then, in state (s1 s2), f · g yields (the equivalent of)
successive and independent tosses of an objective f(s1)-coin and an objective g(s2)-
coin.11 If experiments 1 and 2 are “stochastically independent,” it is intuitive to perceive
this prospect as though the order of coin tossing were toss all f(s1)-coins as s1 varies
over S1,a n ds e p a r a t e l ya n dindependently toss all g(s2)-coins as s2 varies over S2.B u t
the prospect consisting of the ﬁrst set of coin tosses is equivalent to f and the second
set is equivalent to g.F u r t h e r ,f is indifferent to a U(f)-coin and g is indifferent to a
U(g)-coin. We conclude that f · g is indifferent to winning 1 util if both the U(f)-a n d
the U(g)-coins, tossedindependently, producefavorableoutcomes, whichisequivalent
to a U(f)U(g)-coin. This “proves” that (5.1) is implied if experiments are seen to be
independent. The converse is similarly intuitive.
Lemma5.1. IfU isanIIDutilityfunction,thenU satisﬁesbothOrthogonalIndependence
and Superconvexity.
























Thus f∗ ·f and f∗ ·g are nonhedging by (4.1).
Superconvexity follows from the fact that
U(g∗ ·θnf)−U(h∗ ·θnf)=[ U(g∗)−U(h∗)]U(θnf)
=[ U(g∗)−U(h∗)]U(f)
10We continue to use the lowercase acronym i.i.d. when referring to single measures, with the usual
meaning of independently and identically distributed.
11A p-coin is one that yields 1 util (or the best outcome z) with objective probability p and 0 utils (or the
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and U(g∗) ≥ U(h∗) if g∗ ≥ h∗.  
To help ﬁx ideas, we describe one example of an IID utility. Fix a (closed) set L of
probability measures on S, thought of as the set of priors applying to any single experi-
ment. Let12
PWF = clh(L∞)  where L∞ ≡

i∈N
 i: i ∈ L for every i

  (5.2)
Since the utility of any ﬁnitely based act is a minimum over L∞, which consists exclu-
sively of product measures, (5.1)i so b v i o u s ;s oi sSymmetry. Therefore, UWF deﬁned
by
UWF(f) = inf
P∈L∞Pf  f ∈ F  (5.3)
is an IID utility function. This product is adapted from Walley and Fine (1982),a n dw a s
studied also by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).
We emphasize that UWF isjustoneexampleofanIIDutilityfunction. Itiswellknown
in the decision-theoretic literature (see Hendon et al. 1996 and Ghirardato 1997)t h a t
stochastic independence is multifaceted in the multiple-priors (or nonadditive proba-
bility) framework, and hence that there is more than one way to form an independent
product from a given set L of priors over S. In other words, in general and in contrast
to the Bayesian setting, there are many utility functions satisfying (5.1), and hence the
“stochastic independence” embodied in it, that also agree on the ranking of acts over
any single experiment.
5.2 A representation result
Some preliminaries are needed before we can state the representation. Any set of pri-
ors P lies in Kc( ( )), the space of compact and convex subsets of  ( ); the Hausdorff
metric topology renders it a compact metric.
Each P ∈ Kc( ( )) corresponds to a unique multiple-priors preference or, equiva-




This correspondence induces a compact metric topology on
U =

UP :P ∈ Kc( ( ))

 
The subset of IID utility functions,
V ={ U ∈ U :U is IID} 
inherits the induced topology.
12Denote by

t∈I  t the unique countably additive product measure with marginals  t.S i n c eL∞ is not
convex, we take its closed convex hull, denoted by clh(L∞), so as to conform to the normalization that sets
of priors are closed and convex. The sets clh(L∞) and L∞ generate the identical preference.332 Epstein and Seo Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
Theorem 5.2. The preference   on F is a multiple-priors preference and it satisﬁes Sym-
metry, Orthogonal Independence,a n dSuperconvexity if and only if it admits representa-




V( f)d μ ( V) for all f in F  (5.4)
for some Borel probability measure μ on V.M o r e o v e r ,μ is unique.
The proof of sufﬁciency is relegated to Appendix B. Here brieﬂy consider necessity
(see Appendix B for further details). The ﬁrst step is to verify that the integrand on the
right is well deﬁned for every f. This is done by showing that the function V  −→ V( f)
is universally measurable and by making use of the fact that any measure μ admits a
unique extension, also denoted μ, to the universal completion of  . (A similar proce-
dure is used throughout, without explicit mention, to make sense of integrals where
measurability issues arise.)
Turntoaxioms. SinceU isamixtureofsymmetricutilityfunctions,itisalsosymmet-
ric. We showed above (Lemma 5.1)t h a tOrthogonal Independence and Superconvexity
aresatisﬁedbyanyIIDutilityfunction—theargumentisreadilyextendedtoanymixture
of IID utility functions as in the representation.
The theorem generalizes de Finetti’s, wherein each IID utility function in the sup-
port of μ is an expected utility function with i.i.d. probabilistic beliefs. The more general
representation (5.4) suggests an interpretation similar to that familiar for a mixture of
i.i.d.beliefs. AnyIIDutilityfunctionreﬂectstheviewthatexperimentsareindistinguish-
able (because of Symmetry) and unrelated or independent. Thus experiments would
be indistinguishable and independent if the individual knew which IID utility function
were appropriate or correct. However, she is uncertain of that, as reﬂected by the mea-
sure μ. Overall, therefore, she views experiments as being IID conditionally on the cor-
rect V . Because the possible functions V correspond to multiple priors rather than to
expected utility, the individual may value randomization, as illustrated in (3.2), and ac-
cordingly not view experiments as being identical.
Toillustrate, supposethateachIIDfunction inthesupport of μ hastheformin(5.3).
Then, a slight abuse of notation, where the uncertainty modeled by μ is translated into







Given resolution of that uncertainty and thus a speciﬁc L, the same set is assumed to
describe each experiment (because the minimum is over L∞). This implies that exper-
iments are indistinguishable (or viewed symmetrically). However, experiments are not
viewed as identical because L∞ admits that different likelihoods from L apply to differ-
ent experiments.
In the concrete setting of coin-tossing, any (convex) set L of likelihoods can be iden-
tiﬁed with an interval I =[ Im IM]⊂[ 0 1], interpreted as a set of possible probabilities
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on knowing I, coin tosses are viewed as indistinguishable ambiguous experiments, in-
dependent from one another in the speciﬁc sense of (5.2). How the model can accom-
modate the value of randomization is easily seen in (3.2), and this is so even when there
is certainty about I. Suppose Im < 1




























 1(H1)(1− 2(H2))+(1− 1(H1)) 2(H2)

= min{Im(1−Im) IM(1−IM)}
≥ Im(1−IM) = U(H1T2) = U(T1H2) 
The representation result leads to an interesting implication about the perceived
value of repetition, which, at a mathematical level, extends the fact that for any ran-
dom sequence (Xt) having an exchangeable probability law, Xi and Xj are positively
correlated if i  = j.13
Theorem 5.3. If the multiple-priors preference   satisﬁes Symmetry, Orthogonal Inde-
pendence,a n dSuperconvexity, then, for any act f ∈ F{1     n},
f ∼ p  ⇒ f ·θnf   p2  (5.6)










V( f)d μ ( V)
2
= (U(f))2 = p2 
w h e r ew eu s et h ef a c tt h a te v e r yV is symmetric (and hence also invariant to shifts) and
a product utility function, and also the familiar property that the geometric average is at
least as large as the arithmetic average.  
Forsimplicity,considerthespecialcaseofbets(binaryacts). SupposethatabetonA
is indifferent to the bet on a coin with known objective probability p. How would an in-
dividual rank twofold repetitions of each? In the case of the coin, the two tosses would
be independent and thus have probability p2 of success. For the subjective bet, the rep-
etitions are not plausibly viewed as independent in general, as de Finetti pointed out in
the Bayesian setting. Where there is a common element connecting experiments—such
as the uncertain bias of a coin that is tossed repeatedly—experiments are presumably
viewed as positively correlated, which makes bets such as A × A more attractive than
13See Theorem 5.1 in Hewitt and Savage (1955).334 Epstein and Seo Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
twofold independent replicas of the bet on A. This intuition relies only on the individ-
ual having a conditionally i.i.d. (or IID) view of experiments and not on the experiments
conforming to a Bayesian (probabilistic) model.14






V( f)d μ   (5.7)
where M ⊂  (V) is a set of probability measures over the set V of IID utility functions.
It is not difﬁcult to see that this functional form, with each V being a Walley–Fine IID
utility function, for example, can accommodate both of the motivating behaviors (3.2)
and (3.3). More generally, it includes both of our models as special cases and seems to
be an obvious candidate for the missing unifying model. The model satisﬁes Symmetry
and Superconvexity,b u tn o tOrthogonal Independence.15 We do not have an axiomatic
characterization of (5.7).
5.3 T h er e p r e s e n t a t i o no fs e t so fp r i o r s
The representation given in Theorem 5.2 is for utility functions, while de Finetti’s theo-
remisaboutbeliefs. Theformerseemsmoreappropriateforadecision-theoreticmodel,
but it is interesting to consider also a formulation that is closer to de Finetti’s. In his the-
orem, every exchangeable measure is represented as a mixture of i.i.d. measures. Here,
every set of priors consistent with our axioms is a (suitably deﬁned) mixture of IID sets
of priors.
To state this formally, deﬁne
  =

Q ∈ Kc( ( )):Q is an IID set

 
Since   is homeomorphic to V,e a c hm e a s u r eo nV corresponds to a unique measure on
 , and we use the same symbol to denote both. Given μ ∈  ( ), use Aumann’s integral
for a correspondence to deﬁne the set of priors

 Qdμ(Q). (Technical details are pro-
vided in Appendix B, which also contains, in Section B.1, all the ingredients of a proof of
the following corollary.)
Corollary 5.4. Let   be represented by multiple-priors utility U as in (2.1)w i t hs e to f






for the Borel probability measure μ on   corresponding to the measure on V appearing
in (5.4).
14EvenintheBayesiancase,wehavenotfoundintuitionfor(5.6)thatreliessolelyontheaxioms,without
recourse to the representation.
15Details are omitted.Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Symmetry of evidence 335
When all IID sets have the form in (5.2), one obtains a representation even closer to





likelihoods is a singleton, and hence that eachexperiment is described by the same like-
lihood. Here, by contrast, multiple likelihoods are associated with each experiment.17
5.4 Ambiguity and dissimilarity
The next theorem describes axiomatically the gap between de Finetti’s model and ours.
Theorem 5.5. Let the multiple priors preference   satisfy Symmetry, Orthogonal Inde-
pendence,a n dSuperconvexity. Then the following statements are equivalent.
(i) Preference   is an expected utility preference.
(ii) Preference satisﬁesStrongExchangeabilityonthesubdomainofactsoverS1×S2,
that is,
αf +(1−α)πf ∼ f for all f ∈ F{1 2} 
(iii) Preference   satisﬁes the Independence on the subdomain F1 of acts over S1.
(i) is the de Finetti model. The other conditions describe alternative characteriza-
tionsofhowitdiffersfromours. Accordingtointuitiongivenearlier,(ii)saysthattheﬁrst
two experiments, and hence also any other pair, are perceived as identical. Following
Gilboa and Schmeidler, we think of violations of Independence as reﬂecting (aversion
to) ambiguity. Therefore, (iii) says that the ﬁrst experiment is unambiguous. Conclude
that our model permits any two experiments to be nonidentical by allowing ambiguity
about any single experiment. This connection seems to us to be intuitive (however, see
Example 4.3, for a speciﬁcation where it is violated).
Proof of Theorem 5.5.( i )  ⇒ (ii) Clear.










































































16clh(·) denotes closed convex hull.
17Contrast also with the representation (3.4), corresponding to Strong Exchangeability, where every ex-
perimentisdescribedbythesamelikelihoodbutwherethereisambiguityaboutwhichlikelihoodiscorrect.336 Epstein and Seo Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
= 1
8[U(f ·θg) +U(θg)+U(f)+U(1)+U(g·θf ) +U(θ f)+U(g)+U(1)]
(by Orthogonal Independence) 
Thus, by Lemma 2.2, there is a common minimizing measure for f and g, and (iii) fol-
lows.
(iii)  ⇒ (i) By Theorem 5.2,t h e r ee x i s t sμ ∈  (V) such that U(f)=

V( f)d μ ( V)for
all f in F. By (iii),
 
V( α f+(1−α)g)−αV (f)−(1−α)V (g)

dμ(V )= 0 for all f g ∈ F1 
Since the integrand is nonnegative for all V ∈ V, we conclude that, for all f g ∈ F1, a.s.-
μ[V ],
V( α f+(1−α)g) = αV (f)+(1−α)V (g). (5.8)
Thusitsufﬁces toshowthatif V ∈ V satisﬁes(5.8), then V is anexpectedutilityfunction.
Assume V satisﬁes (5.8)a n dl e tP be the corresponding set of measures for V .W r i t e
V( B )instead of V( 1B). By the assumption, there exists   ∈  (S) such that, for all A ∈  1,
V( A )=  (A) 
Claim. If P ∈ P,t h e nP(A1 × A2 ×···×An) = V( A 1 × A2 ×···×An) for all Ai ∈  i,
i ≤ n.
Let A = A1 ×A2 ×···×An. Since S is ﬁnite,
P(A)= 1−P( \A) ≤ 1−V(   \A)
≤ 1−

(s1     sn)/ ∈A
V( {(s1     sn)})
= 1−

(s1     sn)/ ∈A
n 
i=1
V( {si}) = 1−

















= V( A )  
But, P(A)≥ minP ∈P P (A) = V( A ) .T h u s ,P(A)= V( A ) .
We conclude that all P ∈ P agree with V and, therefore, with one another, on ﬁnite
rectangles. Since ﬁnite rectangles generate the Borel σ-algebra  , P is a singleton.  
6. Updating
There is a given ordering of experiments (which need not be temporal); sn
1 = (s1     sn)
denotesageneric sampleorhistory oflength n. Ex ante preference on F is  0 ,a n d n sn
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denotes preference on F conditional on the sample sn
1. (When there is no need to em-
phasize the sample, we suppress it in the notation and write  n; similarly for other ran-
dom variables.) We seek a model that describes how preferences evolve along a sample.
There is an implicit assumption in this setup that should be made explicit. We have
deﬁned outcomes in terms of util/probability equivalents, which obviously depends on
howtheindividualrankslotteries(constantacts)overtheunderlyingphysicaloutcomes
(represented earlier by the set Z). This rescaling of outcomes is straightforward when
dealing with a single preference order. However, when there are several preferences, as
is the case here, in general they may disagree on how to rank lotteries, and thus any
given physical action translates into a different act depending on which preference or-
der is being considered. Our implicit assumption is that  0 and every conditional pref-
erence  n agree on the ranking of lotteries. That justiﬁes interpreting any given f in F
as representing the same physical action for all the noted preferences.
Our model of updating applies to the second model above, where experiments are
not necessarily identical. Thus assume that  0 and every  n satisfy the axioms of The-
orem 5.2,n a m e l ySymmetry, Orthogonal Independence,a n dSuperconvexity.C a l lt h i s
composite axiom Basic.
We assume also Consequentialism—the conditional ranking given the sample sn
1
does not take into account what the acts might have delivered had a different sample
been realized. Formally, we make the following assumption.
Consequentialism. We have f  ∼n sn
1 f if f (sn
1 ·) = f(sn
1 ·).
6.1 Weak dynamic consistency
We postulate the following weak form of dynamic consistency. Abbreviate F{n+1 n+2    }
by F>n.
Weak Dynamic Consistency (WDC). For any n ≥ 1, sample sn−1
1 ,a n da c t sf  f ∈ F>n,
f   n (sn−1
1  sn) f for all sn  ⇒ f   n−1 sn−1
1
f 
f   n (sn−1




usual notion of dynamic consistency that we abbreviate DC. In that case, when the acts
f  and f can depend on all experiments, each si is both a signal and a payoff-relevant
state. In contrast, for each comparison in WDC, states are either signals (s1     sn), or
payoff-relevant (sn+1    ), but not both.T h u sWDC requires dynamic consistency in the
ranking of terminal payoffs as “pure signals” are received, and beliefs and rankings of
future prospects are updated.
Note that WDC is weaker than DC even in the Bayesian context. DC implies Bayes’
Rule, but, as will become evident below, WDC does not. However, as argued in the In-338 Epstein and Seo Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
troduction, it is strong enough to accommodate important settings. There are many
cases where an individual observes signals and uses them to learn about a payoff rel-
evant parameter. Here the signals are (s1     sn) for some n and the parameter is
(sn+1 sn+2    ).
Since all utility functions satisfy the axioms in Theorem 5.2, each admits a represen-
tation in terms of a unique measure over V, the set of IID utility functions. Their utility
functions are U0 and Un(·|sn
1) for  0 and  n sn
1, respectively. Frequently, dependence on










V( f( s n
1 ·))dμn(V ) for all f ∈ F 
for some probability measure μn that depends on the realized sample sn
1. The updat-
ing problem thus reduces to describing the evolution of μn as a function of μ0 and the
realized sample.
TheimplicationsofWDCandtheotheraxiomsaredescribedintermsofalikelihood
function L:V →  ( ),w h e r eV  −→ L(B|V)is (Borel) measurable for each measurable
subset B of  . Think of L(B|V)as the likelihood of B ⊂  , a set of inﬁnite samples,
conditional on V describing the perception of experiments. These likelihoods are used
in describing inferences drawn afterobserving a sample; theyarenottobethoughtofas
describingexantebeliefs. Foreach n andlikelihoodfunction L, Ln isitsone-step-ahead
conditional at stage n, Ln:Sn−1 ×V →  (S).18 Thus for each sample sn−1
1 , Ln(·|V)∈  (S)
gives the probability distribution, or likelihood, for the nth experiment, conditional on
sn−1
1 and the given V .
The central result in our model of updating follows.
Theorem 6.1. The axioms Basic, Consequentialism,a n dWDC are satisﬁed if and only if
the representing probability measures {μn} are related as follows: There exists a likelihood








Ln(·|V)d μ n−1(V ) (6.2)
is a probability measure on S having full support.
18More precisely, Ln(·|V)is a regular conditional probability on Sn given sn
1 (suppressed in the notation),
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Ln(sn)Un(f|sn)  f ∈ F>n  (6.3)
which implies WDC.
See Appendix D for the proof of sufﬁciency. The argument amounts to showing that
the problem is a special case of afﬁne aggregation (see De Meyer and Mongin 1995);
other special cases include Harsanyi’s (1955) aggregation theorem and probability ag-
gregation (Mongin 1995).
The theorem may be surprising at ﬁrst glance and some discussion is in order. Two
features stand out: (i) likelihood functions are not tied to the ex ante preference  
and (ii) the implied process of posteriors {μn} is identical to that implied by a suitable
Bayesian model. We elaborate on each in turn.
In the absence of ambiguity, when prior beliefs are probabilistic, it is standard prac-
tice to use them to deﬁne likelihood functions for updating, as in Bayes’ Rule. The nor-
mative argument for doing so is that Bayesian updating delivers DC. However, if only
WDC is sought, then even under subjective expected utility, one can use any likelihood
function to deﬁne updating. Also more generally, any likelihood function L can be used
for updating in such a way as to satisfy WDC. In particular, though L is derived from the
entire set of (conditional) preferences, it plays no role in the representation of ex ante
preference. Its role is exclusively to represent updating. The divorce from prior beliefs
of the likelihoods used for updating does not contradict WDC: prior beliefs about sig-
nals underlie choice, but since in WDC, signals are assumed not to be payoff-relevant,
consistency across time does not require that they play a role when processing signals.
Turn to the connection with updating in a Bayesian model. Given a likelihood func-
tion L and prior μ as in the theorem, deﬁne L ∈  ( ) by
L(·) =

L(·|V )dμ(V ) 
Note that then the one-step-ahead conditional of L at stage n is Ln deﬁned by (6.2). It
follows that the identical process {μn} arises in an expected utility model where L(·) is
the Bayesian prior.19 This is not to say that our model is observationally equivalent to
19Without further assumptions, L need not be exchangeable. Thus the shadow Bayesian model is not de
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the corresponding Bayesian model; both involve the identical process of posteriors, but
the two models of choice are distinct. For example, only in the shadow Bayesian model
do ex ante and conditional preferences satisfy the Independence axiom; in our model
preferencesatnodenarerepresentedbythemutliple-priorsutilityfunction

Vd μ n(V ).
The existence of a shadow Bayesian model is an advantage in terms of tractability, since
it permits application of results from the Bayesian literature about the dynamics of pos-
teriors.
The emergence ofadditive likelihood functions in spite of thepresence of ambiguity
should by now not be surprising. At the functional form level, it is a consequence of
preferences being represented by additive measures μn. The latter, in turn, emerges as
a consequence of Orthogonal Independence. We pointed out when discussing OI that it
rules out (in the coin-tossing example) ambiguity about the physical bias of the coin;
hedging gains arise only from the poorly understood idiosyncratic factors that affect
experiments and render them nonidentical.








Refer to wn(sn V)as the weight of evidence for V provided by sn (and the suppressed
sn−1
1 ). Then the weight of evidence process is unique (up to nullity), because {μn} is
unique and hence so are the Radon–Nikodym densities dμn/dμn−1.
On the one hand, the likelihood function L is typically not unique. Suppose, for ex-
ample, that signals are perceived to be uninformative, so that μn = μ for all n.T h e n
any speciﬁcation with Ln(·;V)= Ln(·), where the latter measures are arbitrary, satis-
ﬁes (6.1). On the other hand, if for each history sn−1
1 , the conditional utility functions
Un(·|sn), sn ∈ Sn, are linearly independent, then it follows immediately from (6.3)t h a t
{Ln(·)} is unique and thus the conditional likelihoods Ln(·;V)= wn(·;V) Ln(·) are also
unique for each sn. Uniqueness of L follows (up to μ-nullity).
We summarize the preceding statements more formally. First, we add the axiom.20
Non-Collinearity. For each n, the collection {Un(·|sn
1):sn
1 ∈ Sn} is linearly indepen-
dent, where each function Un(·|sn
1) is viewed as a function on F>n.
Corollary 6.2. Let L  and L be two likelihood functions that satisfy the conditions in
Theorem 6.1.T h e n ,f o re v e r yn,
w 
n(·;v)= wn(·;v) μn−1-a.s. 
where the weights processes {w 
n} and {wn} are deﬁned as in (6.4). Moreover, if Non-
Collinearity is satisﬁed, then L (·|V)= L(·|V)μ -a.s.
20Recall that utilities are “probability equivalents”; thus, it is legitimate to use Un(·|sn
1) in an axiom for
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6.2 The dynamics of beliefs
The preceding section deﬁnes a rich framework for modeling updating. There is room
for more structure to be imposed on updating via additional axioms on preferences that
restrict the likelihood function L provided by Theorem 6.1. Rather than pursue further
axiomatizations here, we turn instead to illustrating what the model can deliver.
Two properties are immediate and apply at a very general level: (i) Ambiguity
is, in general, not monotonic along a sample. Posterior probabilities μn(V ) are not
monotonic under Bayesian updating. Thus, for example, if μ has two points of sup-
port V   and V , and if V  (·) ≤ V( ·) (the set of priors for V   includes that for V ), then
the set of priors corresponding to Un decreases with n (in the sense of set inclusion) if
μn(V ) increases, but increases in size if μn(V ) decreases. (ii) Ambiguity need not vanish
asymptotically (this is illustrated and discussed further below).21
By way of illustration, we adopt a number of specializations. First, we assume
that μ0, representing ex ante beliefs, has support on Walley–Fine IID utility functions,







Forconcretenessandtoaidinterpretation, weconsidercoin-tossing, S ={ H T}, though
considerable generalization is possible. Then, as pointed out following (5.5), each set L
can be identiﬁed with a probability interval IL for heads, and beliefs μn are deﬁned over
the set of all intervals contained in [0 1]. Previously, the likelihood function L(·|V)used
for updating was conditioned on the IID utility function V . Here, the latter is in one-to-
one correspondence with a set L and, hence, with a probability interval for heads. Thus








for all intervals I , I. The interpretation is that beliefs about the probability intervals
evolveaccordingtothereweightingdescribedbythelikelihoodratio Ln(sn|I )/Ln(sn|I).
This is just as in Bayesian updating of beliefs about the relevant parameter, which here
is a probability interval for heads. (To remind the reader, the coin is represented by an
interval because the physical bias of the coin is only part of the story; tossing technique
is thought to be important to a degree corresponding to the length of the probability
interval.)
We specialize the likelihood function by assuming that for μ0-almost every I (or L),
the following statements are true.




 ∞(·)dλI( ) (6.5)
21Though our model does not permit inﬁnite samples, asymptotic results can be interpreted as approxi-
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for a unique probability measure λI on  ({H T}).
L2. Measure λI has support equal to I. (Here and below we identify λI also with a
measure on [0 1] in the obvious way.)
L1 asserts that even conditional on the probability interval I, there is still uncer-
tainty, represented by λI, about which i.i.d. law describes experiments. Acemoglu et al.
(2009) study updating in a completely Bayesian model where likelihoods are speciﬁed
as in (6.5) so as to capture situations where, for agents trying to learn about I, signals
are difﬁcult to interpret. In their case, I is an abstract parameter rather than a proba-
bility interval. Here signals are difﬁcult to interpret exactly because experiments are not
identical.
L2 asserts that when drawing inferences from a signal about a particular interval I,
that is, when conditioning on I, the i.i.d. laws taken into account are precisely those for
which the probability of heads lies in the interval. (An immediate implication is that
L(·|I) ∈ clh(L∞).)
IfI isthedegenerateintervalatp ∈[ 0 1],thenL1impliesthatL(·|p)isthei.i.d.mea-
sure with probability of heads equal to p. If the preceding obtains for every I in the
support of μ0, de Finetti’s model, including Bayesian updating, is obtained.
We can now state a counterpart for our framework of the Savage result that data
eventually swamp the prior.
Proposition 6.3. Suppose that the likelihood function L satisﬁes L1 and L2, and that
μ0 has ﬁnite support.
(i) Suppose further that for any I   = I in the support, I  and I are disjoint. Then, for
every I with μ0(I)>0,
μn(I) → 1 L(·|I)-a.s.
(ii) Let μ0 have support {I p},w h e r ep(H) ∈ I is permitted. If p is not an atom of λI,
that is, if λI(p) = 0,t h e n
μn(p) → 1 p∞-a.s.
Part (i) is the indicated counterpart. The assumption of disjoint intervals is an intu-
itive identiﬁcation assumption. The set G of samples along which μn(I) converges to 1
satisﬁes L(G|I) = 1 and, hence, also
 ∞(G) = 1 λI-a.s.
Since λI has full support (L2), this clariﬁes the sense in which G is a large set.
Note that even given certainty about I, in general there remains ambiguity when
predicting future experiments and ranking bets over their outcomes. For example, an
individual could become certain about the physical bias of the coin, but in general re-
main ambiguous about the outcomes of future experiments because of her limited un-
derstanding of the effects of tossing technique, particularly her view that these are un-
related across tosses. Alternatively, if the truth is that experiments are i.i.d. with prob-
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in the support of μ0), and if the identiﬁcation condition is satisﬁed, then the individual
asymptotically becomes certain of the true law with probability 1 according to the truth,
and there is no ambiguity remaining (she uses the i.i.d. measure corresponding to p to
predict future outcomes).
Part (ii) is an illustrative result for the case when intervals may overlap. Here there is
convergence to the truth, though the prior attaches positive probability to I and, hence,
toexperimentsdiffering. Theoverallmessageisthatwhetherambiguitypersistsasymp-
toticallydepends(on thesampleand) ontheprior view ofexperiments. Iftheindividual
is certain that each new coin toss is inﬂuenced by a different and hard-to-understand
technique, then, even after learning the coin’s bias, it is rational to take this limited un-
derstanding into account for further prediction and choice. However, the model does
not force ambiguity to persist in all circumstances.
A ﬁnal example exploits the fact that the “parameters” I being learned about are
probability intervals. Let μ0 have support {I  I},w h e r e
I  =[ p−δ  p+δ ]  I =[ p−δ p+δ] and δ  >δ>0 
Thus the intervals have a common midpoint but differ in length. Accordingly, we inter-
pret that the individual entertains two hypotheses that differ only in how similar exper-
iments are seen to be; obviously, they are more similar according to I. We ask how the
posterior probability μn(I) behaves in large samples.
Specialize L1 and L2 by assuming further that λI  and λI are uniform on their re-
spectiveintervals. Althoughwedothisforconcreteness, theuniformdistributionseems
natural. It delivers the following result for the limiting probability of I22: Denote by  I









Note that, by (D.1) and the full support property L2, the set of samples  I has positive
probability according to both L(·|I ) and L(·|I).
For samples in  I, the limiting empirical frequency of heads is consistent with both
I and I . This identiﬁcation problem leads to the result that 0 <μ ∞(I)<1; neither hy-
pothesis is dismissed entirely along such samples, even in the limit. This is an instance
of the identiﬁcation problem studied by Acemoglu et al. (2009). In spite of differences
between the two models, some of their other results also translate into our setting. In
particular, one could use concern about nonidentical experiments to justify asymptotic
disagreement between individuals.
Another noteworthy implication of (6.6)i st h a tμ∞(I)>μ 0(I), that is, any sample
thatisconsistentwithbothhypothesesleadseventuallytoashiftinprobabilitymassto-
ward the “more precise” hypothesis. Given a sample, the difﬁculty in making inferences
aboutfutureexperimentsisthattheyarenotseentobeidentical. Hereexperimentsmay
22The claim (6.6) to follow is adapted from Acemoglu et al. (2009, Lemma 1). The latter implies also that
for the lack of asymptotic learning, it would be enough for λI  and λI to have positive and continuous
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differ according to both I  and I, but they differ more according to I . Thus the sample
provides less information about future experiments under I  than under I. This leads
to a shift in weight toward I.
7. Regularity or monotone continuity?
Return to the static or one-shot choice setting. With the convention that outcomes are







Pf  f ∈ F  (7.1)
where C ⊂ ba
1
+( ) is a convex and weak*-compact set of ﬁnitely additive probability
measures on (   ).23 Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) prove that this model is character-
ized by a simple set of axioms.
At the functional form level, our version of multiple-priors (2.1) is evidently the spe-
cial case where the Gilboa–Schmeidler set of priors C is the weak*-closure of a convex
and weak-convergence closed set P of countably additive priors. Our main objective in
this section is to describe the behavioral meaning of this specialization.
The rationale for the specialization is straightforward: Just as countable additivity is
assumed widely in the central theorems of probability theory, including in the de Finetti
Theorem that concerns us here, we specialize multiple-priors utility to provide a coun-
terpartofcountableadditivity.24 SinceChateauneufetal.(2005)putforthamorerestric-
tive way to express “countableadditivity” for a set of priors, we examine it in some detail
and argue that, although it is in some sense simpler, it is unduly restrictive, particularly
for a setting with repeated experiments.
7.1 Regularity
The added axiom that we impose on preference, or utility, is Regularity, a property ﬁrst
studied by Epstein and Wang (1996). Roughly, it extends to preferences the well known
property of regularity of probability measures.25 A connection to countable additivity is
thatanymeasureonacompactmetricspaceiscountablyadditiveifandonlyifitisregu-
lar (Dunford and Schwartz 1958, p. 138). Thus it is not easy to distinguish between these
properties within the space of measures. However, as will become evident, they lead
to substantially different notions more generally, and we argue that there is a distinct
advantage to using regularity to deﬁne the ambient technical framework.
23The following additional notation is needed here. For any compact metric space X,b a (X) and ca(X)
denote the spaces of ﬁnite variation set functions on the Borel σ-algebra that are ﬁnitely additive (charges)
and countably additive, respectively; ba
1
+(X) and ca1
+(X) are the corresponding subsets of positive and
normalized measures. The notation ca1
+(X),i np l a c eo f (X), is useful when it is important to draw a
distinction between ﬁnitely and countably additive probability measures. Unless otherwise speciﬁed, the
weak-convergence topology is used for ca1
+(X). By the weak*-topology on ba( ), we mean the topology
induced by bounded measurable functions.
24See Regazzini (1996) and Dubins (1974, 1982) for approaches that assume only ﬁnite additivity.
25The reader is referred to Epstein and Wang (1996) for detailed discussion of regularity of preferences,
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The set of all [0 1]-valued acts on   is F. Denote by Fu the set of all upper semicon-
tinuous (usc) and simple (ﬁnite-ranged) acts, and denote by F  the set of lower semi-
continuous (lsc) and simple acts. As shown above, under suitable conditions there is a
unique probability-equivalent utility function U,d e ﬁ n e di n( 2.3), that represents pref-
erence. Thus we can state the sought-after condition in terms of that utility function.26
Regularity. A utility function U :F →[ 0 1] and the corresponding preference order are
regular if both of the following conditions are satisﬁed.
Inner Regularity.F o r e a c h h ∈ F , U(h)= sup{U(g):g ≤ h g ∈ Fu}.
Outer Regularity.F o r e a c h f ∈ F, U(f)= inf{U(h):h ≥ f h ∈ F }.
To see the parallel with the notion of regularity for a measure, think of the special
case of acts that are indicator functions, and note that the indicator 1A is simple and
usc (lsc) if A is closed (open). This parallel inspired the closely related, but distinct,
deﬁnition of regularity of preference in Epstein and Wang (1996). The relation is that U
is regular in the above sense if and only if its conjugate U∗,
U∗(f) = 1−U(1−f)  f ∈ F 
is regular in the sense of Epstein and Wang. For another perspective on the difference
betweenthetwodeﬁnitionsofregularity,observethattheEpstein–Wangnotionrequires
that
U(f)= sup{U(g):g ≤ f g ∈ Fu}  ∀f ∈ F 
that is, the utility of arbitrary acts can be approximated from below (by simple usc acts).
In contrast, Outer Regularity above postulates that the utility of arbitrary acts can be ap-
proximated from above (by simple lsc acts). Approximation from above seems more in-
tuitive given the conservatism inherent in aversion to ambiguity or to limited evidence.
Since any probability measure coincides with its conjugate (P(A)= 1 − P( \A)), the
two notions of regularity coincide in the SEU case, where U(f)= Pf for a ﬁxed P,w i t h
the usual notion of regularity of the measure P.27
We can now state the main result of this subsection, which shows that Regularity
characterizes our specialization of the Gilboa–Schmeidler model.28
26We state Regularity for any utility function U.A s s h o w n i n Epstein and Wang (1996),t h ea x i o mi s
readily expressed explicitly in terms of preference for a large class of preferences.
27Moreprecisely,itfollowsfromEpsteinandWang(1996,Theorem4.1)thatanSEUpreferencewithprior
P is regular in the sense of Epstein–Wang if and only if it is regular in the sense of this paper if and only if P
is a regular measure.
28See Appendix A for a proof, which relies, for one direction, on a result by Chen (2010).W e r e m i n d
the reader that since the probability-equivalent utility U corresponds uniquely to preference, the theorem
could be restated in terms of the latter. Finally, see Philippe et al. (1999, Proposition 1) for a related result
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Theorem 7.1. Let U be a multiple-priors utility as in (7.1). Then U satisﬁes Regularity
if and only if it can be expressed in the form (2.1)f o rs o m eP ⊂ ca1
+( ) that is convex and
(weak-convergence) compact. Moreover, the set P is unique.
An important implication of Regularity is that utility is completely determined by its
values on ﬁnitely based acts. Much as the Kolmogorov Extension Theorem tells us that
a probability measure on   = S∞ (which is necessarily regular given that   is metric) is
completelydeterminedbyitsvaluesonﬁnitecylinders,ageneralizedextensiontheorem
proveninEpsteinandWang(1996,TheoremD.2)impliesthataregularutilityisuniquely
determined by its values on Fﬁn.29 This feature of our model of multiple-priors utility
was behind the scenes of a number of results stated above.
For example, consider the proof of Proposition 3.1. Symmetry implies that prefer-
ence over Fﬁn is represented both by P and by {πP:π ∈   P ∈ P}; hence, they represent
the same preference over F by Epstein and Wang (1996, Theorem D.2). Therefore, they
must be identical by the uniqueness of the representing set of priors (Theorem 7.1).
As a second example, consider a gap in the proof that (i) implies (ii) in Theorem 3.2.
Let  U(f)= U(α f+(1−α)πf). StrongExchangeabilityimplies  U = U onFﬁn. LemmaA.1
shows that  U satisﬁes Regularity. Therefore,  U(f)= U(f) for all f ∈ F by Epstein and
Wang (1996,T h e o r e mD . 2 ) .
7.2 An alternative: Monotone continuity
An alternative way to express countable additivity for a set of priors, put forth by
Chateauneuf et al. (2005), is to assume that P itself is weak*-compact, and hence that C
(equals P and) consists exclusively of countably additive measures. What could be a
more natural way to formulate the counterpart of countable additivity of single mea-
sures?
It may seem plausible also at the more meaningful behavioral level. Chateauneuf
et al. show that weak*-compactness of P is characterized behaviorally by Monotone
Continuity.
Monotone Continuity. Given f   g, outcome x, and a sequence {An} in  ,w i t hAn  
∅, then there exists N such that (x AN;f(·)  \AN)   g and f   (x AN;
g(·)  \AN).
AsChateauneufetal.pointout,thisaxiomisusedbyArrow(1970)tocharacterizecount-
able additivity of the Savage prior. Moreover, Monotone Continuity is arguably simpler
than Regularity.30
29The different meaning of “regularity,” explained above, does not affect the validity of the Kolmogorov-
style theorem.
30Monotone Continuity is deﬁnitely easier to state, but it is not clear that its meaning is easier to grasp.
For example, the Borel σ-algebra includes many complicated events that are difﬁcult even to describe.
Hence the scope of a condition that applies to all (measurable) acts is hard to understand. The surprising
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However, Monotone Continuity is stronger than Regularity (weak*-compactness im-
plies weak-convergence compactness for any set of priors), and we argue that the differ-
ence is signiﬁcant.
For example, Monotone Continuity implies that31
U(Bn)   U(B) for all sequences Bn   B 
In contrast, Regularity (via Inner Regularity) imposes only that U(B) can be approxi-
mated from below by U(Bn) by some sequence Bn that increases to B. (In fact, this is
required only if B is open, which notably excludes B being a tail event; however, the
approximating sets must be compact.) To see that the difference between “for all” and
“for some” can be signiﬁcant, consider the following coin-tossing example. The coin
is known to be unbiased, but there remains uncertainty surrounding the tossing tech-
niques of different people. You believe that every person imparts an (idiosyncratic)
effective bias lying in {0  1
2  1
3     1
n    }, but are completely ignorant within this set.
A model that captures this perception is the IID utility function corresponding to L∞,
where













where  k(ω) denotes the empirical frequency of heads in the ﬁrst k tosses along the
sample ω.O b s e r v et h a tBn    . However, U(Bn) = 0 for every n:t h es e to fp ri o r sL∞ in-
cludes an i.i.d. measure Q where heads has probability λ in (0 1/n), and thus according
to which the empirical frequency of heads converges with certainty to λ. Therefore,
U(Bn) = inf
P∈L∞P(Bn) ≤ Q(Bn) = 0 
You would not be willing to bet on Bn because, no matter how large is n, the worst-case
scenario is that many people impart a bias smaller than 1/n, and this would lead to a
sample path not in Bn.B e c a u s e U( )= 1, Monotone Continuity is violated. In con-
trast, there is no contradiction to Regularity, since   can be approximated from below
by some sequence {Kn} of compact sets; Kn =   for all n works trivially.
More generally, while Regularity is consistent with the Walley–Fine IID utility func-
tion (5.3), that model is excluded if Monotone Continuity is assumed, because L∞ is
not weak*-compact unless L is a singleton. Here is a proof: For simplicity, consider
S ={ H T}.L e t 0  1 ∈ L and  0  =  1.F o ra n yr ∈[ 0 1],w ec a nﬁ n d{it}∞
t=1 ∈{ 0 1}∞ such
that 1/N

it converges to r.T h e n ,b yHall and Heyde (1980, Theorem 2.19), the mea-
sure

t  it ∈ L∞ assigns 1 to the event Ar,w h e r eAr is the set that the limiting empirical
frequency of head is (1 − r) 0(H) + r 1(H).I fL∞ were weak*-compact, there would be
31Let Bn   B. Deﬁne An = B\Bn   ∅, f = 1B, and fn = 1Bn = (0 An;f  \An).T h e nMonotone Conti-
nuity implies that, for every  >0,t h e r ee x i s t sN such that V( B N) = V( f N)>( 1− )V (B).348 Epstein and Seo Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
Q ∈  (S∞) such that, by Chateauneuf et al. (2005, Lemma 3), Q(A) = 0 implies P(A)= 0
for all P ∈ L∞.T h u s ,Q(Ar)>0 for all r ∈[ 0 1], which cannot be true.
The Walley–Fine utility function (5.3) is only one example of an IID utility function,
that is, a function satisfying Symmetry and the product rule (5.1). Finally, we show that
Monotone Continuity excludes all IID utility functions other than expected utility func-
tions. Thus in the setting of inﬁnitely many experiments that are viewed symmetrically,
Monotone Continuity excludesmodelingtheperceptionthatexperiments areunrelated
in the natural sense of (5.1).
Theorem 7.2. If V is an IID utility function that satisﬁes Monotone Continuity,t h e nV
is an expected utility function (with an i.i.d. prior).
The key to the proof of the theorem (found in Appendix C)i st os h o wt h a tMonotone
Continuity plus Symmetry and the stochastic independence condition (5.1)i m p l yt h a t
V is0–1-valuedandadditiveon tail,whichimpliesthatallmeasuresinP are0–1-valued
and that they agree on  tail. The rest is straightforward.
The restrictiveness of Monotone Continuity is not limited to settings with repeated
experiments. For example, let the state space be [0 1] and consider the set of priors
P equal to the weak-convergence closed convex hull of {δ0}∪{ δ1/n:n>1}. Thus the
true state is known to lie in {0 1/2     1/n   }, but there is complete ignorance within
the set. Then Monotone Continuity is violated along the sequence Bn ={ 0}∪[ 1/n 1] 
[0 1],since U(Bn) = 0  −→ 1 = U( ). Thisreﬂectsaninherentdiscontinuityarisingfrom
ignorance. Again, Inner Regularity is trivially satisﬁed at  .
Appendix A: Regularity
Proof of Theorem 7.1.






Pf  f ∈ F 
(The term cl
∗(P) denotes the weak*-closure of P in ba
1
+( ).) Therefore, U = V ∗,t h e
conjugate of V ,s a t i s ﬁ e sRegularity.
 ⇒ The multiple-priors utility function U can be extended in the obvious way to
C( ), the set of all continuous real-valued functions on  , and the extension is norm-
continuous, superadditive, monotone, and U(1) = 1. Therefore, it is a support function
for a unique compact and convex set P ⊂ ca1
+( ).I np a r t i c u l a r ,
U(f)= min
P
Pf for every continuous act f 
Let h ∈ F .B yInner Regularity,t h e r ee x i s tgi ∈ Fu such that
gi ≤ h and U(gi)>U( h )+2−i Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Symmetry of evidence 349
Furthermore, there exist continuous acts fi such that
gi ≤ fi ≤ h 
(Whengi = 1Ki and h = 1G are indicator acts, this follows from Urysohn’s Lemma. More
generally, the assertion follows from a straightforward extension of Urysohn’s Lemma
for simple acts; see Epstein and Wang (1996, Lemma A.1).) Finally, it is without loss






















Pf f ∈ F 
By the ﬁrst part of the proof, U is regular, while U is regular by assumption. As just
shown, the two utility functions agree on F . It follows immediately from Regularity
that they must agree on all of F. By the uniqueness of the (weak*-compact and convex)
set of priors, proven by Gilboa and Schmeidler, C is the weak* closure of P.  
The following lemma was used in the proof of Theorem 3.2.
Lemma A.1. If U is regular, then so is  U,w h e r e U(f)= U(α f +(1−α)πf), f ∈ F, for any
ﬁxed α and π.
Proof. Inner Regularity.T a k eh ∈ F . It is clear that U(h)≥ sup{U(g):g ≤ h g ∈ Fu}.
Nextshowequality. ByAliprantisandBorder(2006,Theorem3.13),wecantakecontinu-
ous fn such that fn(ω)   h(ω) for each ω ∈  .B yEpstein and Wang (1996, Lemma D.3),
there exist ﬁnitely based h 
n such that fn ≤ h 


























The second equality follows from Terkelsen’s (1972, Corollary, p. 407) minimax theorem
and the third equality follows by the Monotone Convergence Theorem for each P.
Outer Regularity. Note that
U(α f +(1−α)πf) = inf
P∈P















The second equality follows because f  −→

(αf +(1−α)πf)dP satisﬁes Regularity.  
Appendix B: Proof of Theorem 5.2
After proving necessity, the bulk of the proof concerns sufﬁciency of the axioms. Here
we adapt the Hewitt and Savage (1955) proof strategy for the de Finetti Theorem to our
setting. In broad terms, it amounts to showing that the set U∗ of multiple-priors utility
functionssatisfyingSymmetry,OI,andSuperconvexityiscompactandconvex,andthen
using the Choquet Theorem (Phelps 2001, p. 14) to express any such utility function as
an integral over extreme points of U∗. The proof of uniqueness concludes.
B.1 Necessity
Show ﬁrst that the integral

V V( f)d μ ( V)is well deﬁned for all f in F. Denote by
QIID =

P ∈ Kc( ( )):UP ∈ V

the set of all IID sets of priors. We show below that V and hence also QIID are compact,
hence Borel-measurable. Since μ is well deﬁned on  , the universal completion of  ,i t
sufﬁces to show that the function V  −→ V( f)is universally measurable. This is true if
every set of the form
{P ∈ QIID:∃P ∈ P Pf <c}
= proj ( )


(P P)∈ Kc( ( ))× ( ):P ∈ QIID P∈ P Pf <c

lies in  . But the set being projected is Borel-measurable (in the product σ-algebra).
Therefore, the projection is universally measurable by the Lusin–Choquet–Meyer Theo-
rem (Kallenberg 1997, Theorem A.1.8, p. 457).




V( f)d μ ( V) for all f in F 
The Gilboa–Schmeidler axioms are clearly satisﬁed. OI and Superconvexity can be
proven as in the proof of Lemma 5.1. We need to show that U is a (regular) multiple-
priors utility function. To do so, we establish a suitable set of priors for U.
Since U is homeomorphic to Kc( ( )), μ ∈  (V) c a nb ev i e w e da sam e a s u r eo n
Kc( ( )).T h u s ,w ec a nw r i t e
U(f)=

UQ(f)dμ(Q)  (B.1)Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Symmetry of evidence 351
We deﬁne the Aumann integral

Qdμ(Q) as follows. For a measurable φ:










φ(Q)(A)dμ(Q) for all A ∈   
Let   be the identity function from Kc( ( )) to Kc( ( )) and let Sel  be the set of all
measurable selections from  ,t h a ti s ,φ ∈   if and only if φ is a measurable function




φdμ:φ ∈ Sel 

 
Subsequently, we use the next lemma, which can be proven by a standard argument
using the Lebesgue Dominated Convergence Theorem.
Lemma B.1. Let φ:Kc( ( )) →  ( ) be measurable and let P =











fd P  



















UQ(f)dμ(Q) ≡ U(f) 
where U is deﬁned by (B.1).











for any measurable ˆ f : ( ) → R.G i v e nf ∈ F,d e ﬁ n e ˆ f(P)=


























32The right side is well deﬁned because Q  −→ Q(A) is measurable by Aliprantis and Border (2006,















where the third equality follows by the Change of Variable Theorem (Aliprantis and Bor-
der 2006, Theorem 13.46), and the fourth equality follows by the result cited above.  
Lemma B.3. The set P =

Qdμ(Q) is a convex and weak-convergence compact subset
of  ( ).
Proof. Convexity follows from the convexity of each Q. Prove compactness. The func-
tion   used in the deﬁnition of the Aumann integral can be viewed as a correspon-
dencefromKc( ( ))to ( );itisupperhemicontinuous,compact-valuedandconvex-
valued. Deﬁne also the correspondence    from  (Kc( ( ))) to  ( ),b y
  (μ ) =

 dμ  =

Qdμ (Q)
By Aliprantis and Border (2006, Lemma 19.29, Theorem 19.30),    is compact-valued
and upper hemicontinuous. Therefore, P =   (μ) is compact (Aliprantis and Border
2006, Lemma 17.8).  
B.2 Sufﬁciency: The Hewitt–Savage strategy adapted
We turn to the sufﬁciency part of the theorem. Assume Symmetry, OI,a n dSupercon-
vexity. We exploit heavily the homeomorphism between Kc( ( )),t h es p a c eo fs e t so f
priors, and U ={ UP :P ∈ Kc( ( ))}, the space of (regular) multiple-priors utility func-
tions. We pass freely between them. Recall also that Kc( ( )) and hence also U are
compact metric.
The following preliminary results are straightforward.
Lemma B.4. The mapping P  −→ minP∈P Pf is continuous for any continuous act f.
Proof. This is implied by the Maximum Theorem (Aliprantis and Border 2006,T h e o -
rem 17.31).  
Deﬁne
U∗ ={ U ∈ U :U satisﬁes Symmetry, OI,a n dSuperconvexity} 
Lemma B.5. The set U∗ is compact and convex, and V, the subset of IID utility functions,
is compact.
Proof. As noted, U is compact. The further deﬁning properties of U∗ and V deal with
ﬁnitely based, and hence continuous, acts only. Therefore, Lemma B.5 implies that each
set is closed. Convexity of U∗ is obvious.  
The following lemma is the key to identifying the extreme points of U∗.M u c ho ft h e
next subsection is concerned with proving the lemma. We continue here, assuming the
lemma is true.Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Symmetry of evidence 353
Lemma B.6. For any U ∈ U∗ and f∗ ∈ F{1     m} satisfying U(f∗) ∈ (0 1), deﬁne the func-









Then U∗ U∗∗ ∈ U∗.
Proposition B.7. If U is an extreme point of U∗, written U ∈ ext(U∗),t h e nU ∈ V.33
Proof.L e t U ∈ ext(U∗). It sufﬁces to show that
U(f∗ ·θmf)= U(f∗)U(f) (B.3)
for every f∗ ∈ F{1     m} and f ∈ Fﬁn.
Let P ∈ Kc( (S∞)) be the set of priors corresponding to U. Consider three cases.
Case 1—U(f∗) = 0.T h e n

f∗dP = 0 for some P ∈ P. Therefore,
f∗ ≥ 0  ⇒ f∗(ω) = 0 P -a s   ⇒ (f∗ ·θmf)(ω) = 0 P -a s  
which implies (B.3).
Case 2—U(f∗) = 1.T h e n

f∗dP = 1 for all P ∈ P and, again for all P,
f∗ ≤ 1  ⇒ f∗(ω) = 1 P -a s   ⇒ (f∗ ·θmf)(ω) = θmf(ω)  P-a s 
Therefore,
U(f∗ ·θmf)= U(θmf)= U(f)= U(f∗)U(f) 
where use has been made of the fact that Symmetry implies “shift invariance”:
f ∼ θf for every f ∈ Fﬁn 
Case 3—U(f∗) ∈ (0 1). For every f ∈ F,
U(f)= U(θmf)= U(f∗)U∗(f)+(1−U(f∗))U∗∗(f) 
where U∗ and U∗∗ are deﬁned in Lemma B.6.T h u s
U = αU∗ +(1−α)U∗∗ 
33We show later that the converse is also true—ext(U∗) = V—although we use only the fact that all ex-
treme points lie in V.354 Epstein and Seo Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)






especially for f ∈ FI with ﬁnite I.T h i sp r o v e s( B.3).  
We wish to apply the Choquet Theorem (Phelps 2001, p. 14). For that purpose, note
that U ⊂ E ≡{ αU :α ∈ / R U ∈ U},w h e r eE is a locally convex (vector) space under the
topology generated by sets of the form {αU :a<α<b  U∈ G G open in U}.N o wt a k e
U ∈ U∗.T h e nLemma B.5 and Choquet’s Theorem imply the existence of a Borel proba-
bility measure μ on the set of extreme points of U∗ such that L(U) =

L(V )dμ(V ) for
everycontinuouslinearfunctionalLonE. SinceαU  −→ αU(f)islinearandcontinuous
on E for every continuous f, it follows that
U(f)=

V( f)d μ ( V) (B.4)
for every continuous f. This, in fact, holds for any f ∈ F: From the necessity proof, we
know that f  −→

V( f)d μ ( V)deﬁnes a utility function satisfying Regularity. In addi-
tion, U satisﬁes Regularity by assumption. Finitely based acts are continuous since S
is ﬁnite. Thus we can invoke the generalized Kolmogorov extension theorem in Epstein
and Wang (1996, Theorem D.2) to conclude that (B.4) holds for any f ∈ F.
This completes the proof of sufﬁciency in Theorem 5.2,o n c ew eh a v ep r o v e n
Lemma B.6.
B.3 Remaining arguments regarding extreme points of U∗
The main objective in this section is to prove Lemma B.6, namely that the two functions
U∗ and U∗∗ deﬁned there lie in U∗.
That U∗ ∈ U∗ is straightforward. First, we show that it is regular.





 f ∈ F 
satisﬁes Regularity.
Proof.W e s h o w Outer Regularity; Inner Regularity c a nb es h o w ni nt h es a m ew a y .
Viewf∗ alsoasafunctionof (s1     sm) ∈ Sm.B yR egularityforU,ther eexisthn ∈ F 








1     s 
m ω)
f∗(s 
1     s 
m)
:f∗(s 
1     s 
m)>0

 ω ∈ S∞ Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Symmetry of evidence 355
Then h 
n ∈ F  by Aliprantis and Border (2006, Lemma 17.30). We will show that
hn(ω) ≥ f∗(ω)·θmh 
n(ω) ≥ (f∗ ·θmf)(ω) for each ω ∈ S∞  (B.5)
Fix ω.I ff∗(ω) = 0, the inequality is clear. Assume f∗(ω) > 0.
The ﬁrst inequality in (B.5) holds because
f∗(ω)·θmh 
n(ω) = f∗(s1     sm)·h 
n(sm+1    )
≤ f∗(s1     sm)·
hn(s1     sm sm+1    )
f∗(s1     sm)
= hn(s1     sm sm+1    ) 
For the second inequality, f∗(s 
1     s 
m) · f(s 
m+1    ) ≤ hn(ω ) for each ω  =
(s 
1 s 
2    ). Therefore,
f(sm+1    )≤
hn(s1 s2    )
f∗(s1     sm)
whenever f∗(s1     sm)>0 and
f(sm+1    )≤ min
s1     sm∈S
hn(s1 s2    )
f∗(s1     sm)
= h 
n(sm+1    ) 
which completes the proof of (B.5).
Finally, since U is monotone, U(hn) ≥ U(f∗ ·θmh 
n) ≥ U(f∗ ·θmf).T h u s ,
[U(hn)   U(f∗ ·θmf)]  ⇒[ U(f∗ ·θmh 
n)   U(f∗ ·θmf)] 
which proves Outer Regularity for U∗.
 
It is evident that U∗ (or the preference that it represents) satisﬁes the Gilboa–
Schmeidler axioms. Symmetry is satisﬁed because U(f∗ · θmf)= U(f∗ · (θm(πf))) for
any permutation π,b ySymmetry for U.F o rOrthogonal Independence,l e tf, f  be non-




f∗ ·θm[α(f∗∗ ·f)+(1−α)(f∗∗ ·f )]

= U(α(f∗ ·θmf∗∗)·θmf +(1−α)(f∗ ·θmf∗∗)·θmf )
= αU((f∗ ·θmf∗∗)·θmf)+(1−α)U((f∗ ·θmf∗∗)·θmf )
= αU(f∗ ·θm(f∗∗ ·f))+(1−α)U(f∗ ·θm(f∗∗ ·f )) 
This implies OI for U∗. Superconvexity is also immediate. We conclude that U∗ ∈ U∗.
It remains to prove that U∗∗ ∈ U∗.T h i si sm o r ed i f ﬁ c u l tb e c a u s eU∗∗ is a difference
of two functions derived from U. We show that U∗∗ is suitably monotone and concave,
and that it satisﬁes Regularity. Other properties are immediate.
Lemma B.9. The function U∗∗ deﬁned in (B.2) is monotone on Fﬁn,t h a ti s ,f o ra l lf , f in
Fﬁn,
f  ≥ f  ⇒ U∗∗(f ) ≥ U∗∗(f) 356 Epstein and Seo Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
Proof.T a k e f∗ ∈ Fm and f f  ∈ Fn.F o re a c hτ ∈[ 0 1], there is a common minimizing
measure Pτ for f∗ ·θm(τf  +(1 −τ)f) and θm(τf  +(1−τ)f),b yOI and Lemma 4.1.L e t
ϕ(P τ) =











f∗ ·θm(τf  +(1−τ)f)dPτ 
The partial derivative with respect to τ is ϕτ(P τ) =

f∗ · θm(f  − f)dP. Therefore,
by Milgrom and Segal (2002,T h e o r e m2 ) ,
























We conclude that if f  ≥ f,t h e n

(1 − f∗) · θm(f  − f)dPτ ≥ 0 for all τ ∈[ 0 1] and
U∗∗(f ) ≥ U∗∗(f).  
Lemma B.10. If F ∈ F{1     n},a n di fg∗ and h∗ are nonhedging, then so are
g∗∗ = 1
2θng∗ + 1
2F ·θnh∗ and h∗∗ = 1
2θnh∗ + 1
2F ·θng∗  (B.6)








































































2U(h∗∗)   
Lemma B.11. The function U∗∗ deﬁned in (B.2) satisﬁes Superconvexity.Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Symmetry of evidence 357
Proof.L e t g∗ ≥ h∗ ∈ F{1     m} be nonhedging. Since the denominator 1 − U(f∗) is not
important, consider the function U2 deﬁned by the numerator. Then
U2(g∗ ·θmf)−U2(h∗ ·θmf)= U(g∗ ·θmf)−U(f∗ ·θn(g∗ ·θmf))
−









U(h∗ ·θmf)+U(f∗ ·θn(g∗ ·θmf))

=[ U(g∗ ·θmf)+U(f∗ ·θnh∗ ·θn+mf)]
−[U(h∗ ·θmf)+U(f∗ ·θng∗ ·θn+mf)]
(by Symmetry) =[ U(θng∗ ·θn+mf)+U(f∗ ·θnh∗ ·θn+mf)]
−[U(θnh∗ ·θn+mf)+U(f∗ ·θng∗ ·θn+mf)]
















= 2[U(g∗∗ ·θn+mf)−U(h∗∗ ·θn+mf)] 
where g∗∗ and h∗∗ are deﬁned in (B.6). Note that g∗∗ and h∗∗ are nonhedging by
Lemma B.10.A l s o ,g∗∗ ≥ h∗∗. Therefore, Superconvexity for U implies that it is satisﬁed
also by U∗∗.  
It remains to prove regularity and also that monotonicity and concavity obtain on
all of F. For this purpose we exploit the regularity of U, as described in the following
lemmas. Because the surrounding arguments are routine, many details are omitted.
Let F 
ﬁn = F  ∩Fﬁn, the set of (simple) lsc acts that are ﬁnitely based.34















Proof.T h e s e t P denotes the set of priors corresponding to U. Note that
















(f∗ ·θmh)dP +(1−α) inf




34Since S is ﬁnite, every ﬁnitely based act is continuous, hence lsc. However, we use the notation F 
ﬁn to
emphasizethatwe areusingthelower semicontinuityof such acts, which wouldbe importantin anyfuture





f ≤h ∈F 

[α(f∗ ·θmh)+(1−α)(f∗ ·θmh )]dP
= inf
f≤h∈F 




[α(f∗ ·θmh)+(1−α)(f∗ ·θmh )]dP
= inf
f≤h∈F 
f ≤h ∈F 
U(α(f∗ ·θmh)+(1−α)(f∗ ·θmh )) 
The second equality follows because f  −→

fd Pfor P ∈  (S∞) is monotone and satis-
ﬁes Regularity;h e n c eLemma B.8 implies

f∗ ·θmfd P= inff≤h∈F 

f∗ ·θmhdP.  
Lemma B.13. Let f∗ ∈ F{1     m}.
(a) For any h ∈ F , there exist hn ∈ F 
ﬁn such that hn ≤ h,
U(hn)   U(h) and U(f∗ ·θmhn)   U(f∗ ·θmh) 
(b) For any f  f ∈ F and α ∈[ 0 1], there exist hn h 
n ∈ F  such that
f ≤ hn f ≤ h 
n U ( h n)   U(f)  U(h 
n)   U(f )
U(f∗ ·θmhn)   U(f∗ ·θmh)  U(f∗ ·θmh 
n)   U(f∗ ·θmh )
U(αhn +(1−α)h 










f∗ ·θm(αf +(1−α)f )

 
Proof.( a )B yInner Regularity, there is a sequence gn ∈ Fu such that gn ≤ h and
U(gn)   U(h).B y Epstein and Wang (1996,L e m m aD . 3 ) ,t h e r ee x i s th 
n ∈ F 
ﬁn such
that gn ≤ h 
n ≤ h.T h e n U(h 
n)   U(h). Similarly, by the regularity established in
LemmaB.8,ther eexisth  
n ∈ F 
ﬁn suchthath  
n ≤ handU(f∗·θmh  
n)   U(f∗·θmh).D e ﬁ n e
hn = max{h 
n h  
n} and hn does the job.
(b) By Regularity of U,t h e r ei s hn ∈ F  such that  hn ≥ f and U( hn)   U(f).B y
the regularity established in Lemma B.8,t h e r ee x i s t  hn ∈ F  such that   hn ≥ f and
U(f∗ ·θm  hn)   U(f∗ ·θmf).D e ﬁ n ehn ∈ F  by
hn = min{ hn   hn} 
Then hn ∈ F , hn ≥ f,
U(hn)   U(f) and U(f∗ ·θmhn)   U(f∗ ·θmf) 
The preceding argument is readily extended to prove the remainder of (b), when
combined with Lemma B.12.  
We can ﬁnally complete the proof of Lemma B.6.Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Symmetry of evidence 359
Monotonicity. U∗∗(f ) ≥ U∗∗(f) if f  ≥ f and f  f ∈ F.B y Lemma B.9,t h i si st r u e
if f  and f are ﬁnitely based. The inequality is readily extended to all simple lsc acts and
then to arbitrary acts by using Lemma B.13.
Regularity. Since U∗∗ is increasing, U∗∗(f) ≤ inf{U∗∗(h):h ≥ f h ∈ F }. Lemma B.13
impliesequality,whichprovesOuterRegularity. InnerRegularitycanbeshownsimilarly.
Concavity. We have to show that
U∗∗(αf +(1−α)f ) ≥ αU∗∗(f)+(1−α)U∗∗(f ) for all f  f ∈ F 
Forﬁnitelybasedf  andf,theinequalityfollowsfromLemmaB.11. Itisreadilyextended
to all simple lsc acts and then to arbitrary acts by using Lemma B.13.
We offer a remark related to the proof. Above we showed that every extreme point
of U∗ lies in V. In fact, we can prove, using the representation, that the other direction is
also true.
Lemma B.14. The set V is the set of all extreme points of U∗.
Proof.L e t U ∈ V and show that U is an extreme point of U∗.
The proof of Theorem 5.2, speciﬁcally, application of Choquet’s Theorem, implies
that U(f)=

V( f)d μ ( V)for some μ that is supported by the set of extreme points of
U∗ (and not only by its superset V). Therefore, for f ∈ F{1     m},

V( f)d μ ( V)
2





[V( f) ]2dμ(V ) 
But [

V( f)d μ ( V) ]2 =

[V( f) ]2dμ(V )if and only if
V( f)is constant μ-a s [V ] 
The exceptional set depends on f. But since F1 is separable, there exists a μ-null set
of V ’s that works for all acts. Conclude that a s -μ[V ], V( ·) = U(·) on F{1     m}. Since
this is true for any m, the equality holds a s  on all of F by the generalized Kolmogorov
ExtensionTheorem(EpsteinandWang1996,TheoremD.2). Thus,μisdegenerateandU
is an extreme point of U∗.  
B.4 Uniqueness
Let μ  and μ, Borel measures on the compact metric space V,s a t i s f y

V( f)d μ   =

V( f)d μ for all f ∈ F 
We show that
μ  = μ 360 Epstein and Seo Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
Each ﬁnitely based act f induces (by Lemma B.4) the continuous map  f :V →[ 0 1],
given by
 f(V)= V( f)  
Let  Fﬁn be the set of all such maps and let A = sp( Fﬁn), the linear span of  Fﬁn within
C(V), be the set of continuous real-valued functions on V.T h e n

 f(V)dμ  =

 f(V)dμ for all  f ∈  Fﬁn 
This equality extends also to the linear span:

φ(V )dμ  =

φ(V )dμ for all φ ∈ A 
It is enough to show that

φ(V )dμ  =

φ(V )dμ for all φ ∈ C(V)  (B.7)
We do this by verifying the conditions of the Stone–Weierstrass Theorem, which implies
that A is sup-norm dense in C(V), and hence also (B.7).
Obviously A contains the constant functions and it separates points; in fact, since
every IID utility is regular, if V    = V ,t h e nφ(V  )  = φ(V ) for some φ ∈  Fﬁn ⊂ A. We need
only show that
φ  φ∈ A  ⇒ φ φ ∈ A 
which follows from Steps 1 and 2.
Step 1. Any ﬁnite linear combination of elements in  Fﬁn can be expressed as a linear
combination of two such elements, that is,

i









ai fi(V ) =

i
aiV( f i) 
Supposethateveryai ispositive. Wecanshifteachoftheactsfi sothattheyaremutually
orthogonal and V is additive over them (since every IID utility satisﬁes OI). Because




ai fi = κ h 
If one or more of the coefﬁcients ai is negative, then one can collect those acts that have
similarly signed weights and derive (B.8).Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Symmetry of evidence 361
Step 2. Verifythat(a f +b g)(a  f  +b  g ) ∈ A:
[(a f +b g)(V )][(a  f  +b  g )(V )]
=[ aV (f)+bV (g)][a V( f )+b V( g  )]
= aa V( f·θnf )+ab V( f·θng )+ba




aa    (f ·θnf )+ab    (f ·θng )+ba
    (g ·θnf )+bb    (g ·θng )

(V ) 
where n is large enough so that all paired acts are orthogonal to one another. The last
equality is derived by shifting each of the product acts so that they are mutually orthog-
onal, so that V is additive over them, and then applying shift invariance. Thus (B.8)
implies
(a f +b g)(a  f  +b  g ) = κ h−κ  h  ∈ A 
Appendix C: Proof of Theorem 7.2
Step 1. For all g ∈ F{1     m} and f ∈ F{m+1 m+2    }, V( g· f)= V( g ) V( f) . The equality is
true by (5.1)i ff is ﬁnitely based. Extend it to all acts f indicated by applying Regularity.
Step 2. FixA ∈  tail and deﬁne (where A denotes 1A and so on)
B =
 

























Then B is a monotone class.






















































4 Cn;fn  \Cn

 
(i) If s ∈ Cn,t h e ns/ ∈ Bn and fn(s) = 1
2(1




(ii) By (a)(i), gn ≤ fn. Therefore, V( g n) ≤ V( f n).

































(s)  ⇒ s ∈ B\Bn = Cn 
Therefore, s/ ∈ Cn  ⇒ fn(s) = f(s).362 Epstein and Seo Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
(iv) gn = (1
4 Cn;f  \Cn). This is clear by (a)(iii).
(v)ByMonotoneContinuity,forany >0,ther eexistsN suchthatV( g N)>V( f)− .
Therefore, by (a)(ii), V( f N)>V( f)− .B u tfn
n
  f.W ec o n c l u d et h a t
V( f n)   V( f)   (C.1)




















2A  + 1
2


















































(set A  =  ) 
(b) Assume Bn ∈ B and Bn   B,a n ds h o wt h a tB ∈ B. The argument is similar to that
in (a). We provide an outline for completeness.






















2A  + 1
2

gn = (1 Cn;fn  \Cn) 
(i) If s ∈ Cn,t h e ns ∈ Bn and fn(s) = (1
2A  + 1
2)(s) ∈{1
2 1}.
(ii) By (b)(i), gn ≥ fn. Therefore, V( g n) ≥ V( f n).





































(s)  ⇒ s ∈ Bn\B = Cn 
Therefore, s/ ∈ Cn  ⇒ fn(s) = f(s).
(iv) gn = (1 Cn;f  \Cn). This is clear by (b)(iii).
(v) V( f n)   V( f) .
The rest of the argument is exactly as in (a).
Step 3. By Step 1,
"
m {1     m} ⊂ B. Thus the Monotone Class Lemma (Aliprantis and
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In the same way we can show that, for all A ∈  tail and B ∈  ,
V( 1A ·1B) = V( 1A∩B) = V( A∩B)= V( A ) V( B )   (C.2)
The rest of the proof uses these properties and not Monotone Continuity directly.


































4[V( A ) V( B )+V( A )+V( B )+1]
= 1









2V( A )+ 1
2V( B )  
Step 5. A  −→ V( A )deﬁnes a ﬁnitely additive 0–1-valued measure (or charge) on  tail:
The 0–1 property follows from (C.2). For disjoint A B∈  tail,b yS t e p4,







= V( A )+V( B )  
Step 6. LetP be the set of priors corresponding to V .F o rA ∈  tail, V( A )+V(   \A) = 1.
Thus, V( A )= 0  ⇒ V(   \A) = 1.F u r t h e r ,V( A )= 1  ⇒ P(A)= 1 for all P ∈ P. Since
V( A )= 0 or 1, it follows that
{P(A):P ∈ P}={ 0} or {1} 
Step 7. For each f ∈ F1, there is an exchangeable measure P∗ that is minimizing for f.


































4[V( f·θf ) +V( f)+V( θ f)+1] 
By Lemma 2.2, there is a common minimizing measure P for f and θf .L e t π be the
permutation that switches experiments 1 and 2. Then, using Symmetry,
(πP)f = P(πf)= P(θf)= V( θ f)= V( f)  
Therefore, P and πP are both minimizing for f. Finally, P1 ≡ 1
2P + 1
2πP is also minimiz-
ing (it lies in P because P is convex) and it satisﬁes πP1 = P1.364 Epstein and Seo Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)






2) to deduce that there
is a common minimizing measure Pn for {f θ f     θnf} that satisﬁes πPn = Pn for all
π ∈  n, the set of permutations on {1     n}. Since P is compact, without loss of gener-
ality (after relabeling), Pn → P∗ ∈ P.T h e nP∗ is exchangeable and minimizing for f.
Step 8. Themeasure P∗ in Step 8 is i.i.d. By Step 6, P∗ is 0–1-valued on  tail. But, using
the de Finetti Theorem, it is straightforward to show that the only exchangeable mea-
sures with this property are i.i.d. measures.
Step 9. Forallf  f ∈ F1, V( α f  +(1−α)f) = αV (f )+(1−α)V (f). Take i.i.d. measures
P  for f  and P for f. Since both P  and P are i.i.d. measures and they agree on tail events
(Step 6), they must coincide. Thus, there is a common minimizing measure for f  and f.
Step 10. For all f  f ∈ F, V( α f  + (1 − α)f) = αV (f ) + (1 − α)V (f).F o r a n y n,v i e w
Sn as corresponding to one experiment and repeat the above to derive additivity for all
f  f ∈ F{1     n}. Finally, apply Regularity to extend additivity to all acts.
Appendix D: Proofs for updating
Proof of Theorem 6.1 (Sufﬁciency). We prove (6.1)f o rn = 1; the general argument is
similar.
We use Proposition 1 in De Meyer and Mongin (1995), for which the main step is to
show that D is convex, where
D =

(U(f) U1(f|s1))s1∈S1 :f ∈ F>1

⊂ RS+1 
A preliminary result concerns shifted acts. Recall that θ is the shift operator, so that,
for any act,
(θf)(s1 s2 s3    )= f(s2 s3    ) 
where θn denotes the n-fold replication of θ. Symmetry implies also indifference to
shifts, that is, θf ∼ f for all acts f (see Section 4.2).
Now let x y ∈ D,
x = (U(f) U1(f|s1))s1∈S1 and y = (U(g) U1(g|s1))s1∈S1 
and prove that αx + (1 − α)y ∈ D. Suppose ﬁrst that f and g are ﬁnitely based. Then
thereexists N largeenough so that f and the shiftedact θNg are orthogonal, that is, they
depend on disjoint sets of experiments. For such an N, because each utility function
satisﬁes OI and shift-invariance,
αx+(1−α)y = α(U(f) U1(f|s1))s1∈S1 +(1−α)(U(g) U1(g|s1))s1∈S1




U(α f +(1−α)θNg) U1(αf +(1−α)θNg|s1)

s1∈S1 ∈ D Theoretical Economics 5 (2010) Symmetry of evidence 365
wherethelastequalityfollowsfromOI.Finally,theprecedingreasoningcanbeextended
to general (not only ﬁnitely based) acts f and g by Regularity.
The other conditions in Proposition 1 of De Meyer and Mongin (1995) are readily




as1U1(f|s1)  f ∈ F>1 
Since U(p)= U1(p|s1) = p for all (constant acts) p, it follows that

s1 as1 = 1.
Deduce that, for all f ∈ F>1,






V( f)d μ s1(V ) =

V (f)( s1as1 dμs1(V )) 










Equation (6.1)i ss a t i s ﬁ e df o rn = 1 if
L1(s1|V)= as1(dμs1(V )/dμ(V )) 
Similarly for n>1.
Arguesimilarlyforeveryntoobtainafamily{Ln(·|V) }ofconditionalone-step-ahead
likelihoods. These can be combined in the standard way to yield a unique likelihood
function L(·|V)on  .  
Proof of Proposition 6.3. (i) We adapt a result of Doob as described in Le Cam and
Yang (2000, Propositions 2 and 3, p. 243). For simplicity, consider the special case of
coin-tossing.
Because each L(·|I) is exchangeable, lim n(ω) exists L(·|I)-a.s. and, for any inter-




{ω:lim n(ω) ∈ I}

  (D.1)
Since λI has support in I,t h e nλI(I) = 1. Because intervals are disjoint, for each ω,
there is at most one I such that lim n(ω) ∈ I.D e ﬁ n eF :  → Supp(μ),b y
F(ω)= I if lim n(ω) ∈ I
35De Meyer and Mongin’s condition (C) is satisﬁed here because U(p) = U1(p|s1) = p for all s1 and
0 ≤ p ≤ 1. Therefore, WDC implies their condition P4, and the proposition’s conclusion follows.366 Epstein and Seo Theoretical Economics 5 (2010)
and deﬁne F(ω)= I,w i t hI an arbitrary ﬁxed interval in the support of μ,i flim n(ω) / ∈ "





|I −F(ω)|dL(ω|I)dμ(I) = 0 
which establishes the condition in Le Cam and Yang (2000, Proposition 2). Their Propo-
sition 3 completes the proof.




|I −F(ω)|dL(ω|I) = 0

 
|p−F(ω)|dp∞(ω) = 0 
The former is valid because L({ω:lim n(ω) = p}|I) = λI({p}) = 0.T h u s Le Cam and
Yang’s (2000), Proposition 3 completes the proof.  
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